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STATE INTENTIONS AND THE LAW OF
PUNISHMENT
ALICE RISTROPH*
Forget dogs: do people distinguish between being stumbled over and
being kicked? Assessments of intentions are considerably more complex
than Holmes's classic quip suggests. This Article examines the substantial,
but so far overlooked, role of intent analysis in the constitutional law of
punishment. As a doctrinal matter, the success or failure of a constitutional
challenge to punishment often depends on a judicial assessment of official
intent. As a normative matter, constitutional theory and moral philosophy
offer conflicting accounts of the significance of intentions to the legal or
moral permissibility of acts. Many of the constitutional theorists'
arguments in favor of motive analysis have little applicability in the context
of state punishment, and many of the philosophical reasons to deny the
normative significance of intentions are especially powerful in that context.
If the Constitution is to provide meaningful limitations on the power to
punish, we should reconsider, and reduce, the current doctrinal emphasis
on state intentions.
I. INTRODUCTION
With respect to states of mind, we are of many minds. Sometimes we
think mental states matter, and sometimes we think they don't. Most
simply, bare voluntariness is usually viewed as a threshold requirement for
legal or moral responsibility. Perhaps it seems obvious that purposeful acts
should be treated differently than mere accidents, an intuition reflected in
Holmes's quip that "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked."' In some contexts, legal standards not only ask whether
Associate Professor, Seton Hall University, School of Law. For helpful comments,
thanks to David Enoch, Susan Herman, Adriaan Lanni, Mike Seidman, Carol Steiker, Nelson
Tebbe, and workshop participants at Brooklyn Law School, Harvard Law School, Hofstra
University School of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, Seton Hall University School of
Law, and the 2007 Junior Criminal Law Professors Conference.
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 3 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945)
(1881).
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an action was voluntary rather than accidental, but inquire further and
attempt to determine the actor's specific purposes or reasons for action. In
still other circumstances, the law denies the relevance of subjective mental
states altogether by imposing strict liability standards or "objective" tests.
Again, we are of many minds: sometimes we forgive or even admire those
who mean well but do badly; at other times we say that good intentions
pave the road to hell.
Inquiries into purpose, intention, and motivation are especially
prevalent in constitutional doctrine. 2 Though it is not intuitively obvious
that the government entities regulated by these doctrines can be said to
possess "states of mind" at all, courts have developed various methods to
assess governmental motives or purposes.3 As many scholars have noted,
motives play central roles in First and Fourteenth Amendment analysis.4
The difference between a valid regulation of speech and a violation of the
First Amendment might turn on whether the state intends to suppress
particular ideas.5 The permissibility of public displays of religious symbols
can rest on whether the state intends to promote religion.6  The
2 In this Article, I use the terms "purpose, "intent" or "intention," and "motive" or
"motivation" interchangeably. Occasionally, scholars have distinguished between motive,
understood as the incentive or reason to act, and purpose, understood as the hoped-for result
of one's actions. For example, a murderer may be motivated by anger, but his purpose in
pulling the trigger is to kill. See HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1413-17 (tent. ed.
1958) (distinguishing between motive and purpose in the context of legislative action). Like
several contemporary commentators, I do not find the distinction to be very helpful,
especially in the context of government action, where motive and purpose are always
constructions of a third-party observer. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 413, 426 n.40 (1996) (rejecting distinctions between purpose, intent, motive, basis, and
reason).
3 See infra Parts II.A and II.C.
4 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978), and the subsequent articles in that volume; Sheila Foster,
Intent and Incoherence, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1065 (1998); Kagan, supra note 2; Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 767 (2001); Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The
Case of Cross-Burning, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 197 (2003); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
5 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principal
inquiry... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.").
6 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) ("When the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it
violates [the] central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality .... ").
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constitutionality of state action with disparate impact by race or gender may
turn on whether the state intends to discriminate.7 Courts and academic
commentators alike frequently refer to Holmes and the dog's distinction to
explain these rules: the Constitution is violated not when an individual is
stumbled over by state actors, but only when she is kicked.8
Of course, the state doesn't often literally kick its citizens. But in the
enforcement of criminal laws, it regularly uses physical force against them.
And in the constitutional doctrines that apply to the most systematic and
severe uses of force-imprisonment and execution-state intentions matter
greatly. 9 Constitutional evaluations of prison and death sentences begin
with questions about the state's specific "penological purpose." When
those already incarcerated challenge specific events or conditions within a
prison, constitutional doctrine requires an assessment of prison officials'
intentions. In sharp contrast to the law of constitutional criminal procedure,
which often eschews inquiries into police officers' subjective mental states,
the law of punishment frequently asks what state actors intended.' 0
This Article takes up two questions concerning state intentions, one
inquiry narrow and doctrinal, the other much broader and more conceptual.
With respect to doctrine, the Article examines the substantial, but so far
7 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("[T]he invidious quality of a
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose.").
8 See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866 n.14 ("Just as Holmes's dog could tell the
difference between being kicked and being stumbled over, it will matter to objective
observers whether posting the [Ten] Commandments follows on the heels of displays
motivated by sectarianism, or whether it lacks a history demonstrating that purpose.");
Wilson v. Jones, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1325 (S.D. Ala. 2000) ("The constitution is not
offended [if racially disparate voting districts arise] by happenstance .... It is offended if
the districts are deliberately constructed to achieve that outcome. To paraphrase Justice
Holmes, even a dog knows the difference between being stumbled over and being kicked.");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REv. 56, 98
(1997) ("The most familiar explanation of the relevance of governmental purpose in
constitutional law builds on Holmes's aphorism that '[e]ven a dog distinguishes between
being stumbled over and being kicked."').
9 In discussions of the criminal justice system, the term "use of force" is often used
narrowly in reference to police officers' exercises of force in searches and arrests. Of
course, the prison system itself is also a use of force. Cf Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
26 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[F]orcibly keeping prisoners in detention is what
prisons are all about.").
1o See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404-05 (2006) (noting that officers'
subjective motivations are usually irrelevant to Fourth Amendment doctrine, though
inquiries into "programmatic purpose" are sometimes appropriate); George E. Dix,
Subjective "Intent" as a Component of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 76 Miss. L.J.
373 (2006) (chronicling the general irrelevance of subjective intent in Fourth Amendment
law, and suggesting that courts should "give subjectivity a chance").
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overlooked, role of intent analysis in the constitutional law of punishment.
This task is newly important, as it is only recently becoming evident that
there is a constitutional law of punishment, distinct from the constitutional
law of arrests, investigations, and trial procedure."l As the United States'
prison population continues to expand and as death sentences continue to
capture substantial public and judicial attention, many of the most pressing
controversies in criminal justice concern not the ways in which government
investigates or prosecutes crime, but what it does to criminals after
conviction. " In this context, we need to learn the constitutional law of
punishment, and an important first lesson is the ways in which a state's
penological purposes (or lack thereof) determine the constitutionality of
punishment. 
1 3
State intentions are relevant to the constitutional law of punishment in
three primary ways. First, as a threshold matter, courts may decline to
apply the Ex Post Facto Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, or other
constitutional restrictions on the penal power unless the challenged policy
or practice was adopted with punitive intent. In other words, if a restrictive
state action that resembles punishment--confinement in a state prison, for
example-is intended to serve civil, nonpunitive goals, the constitutional
restrictions on punishment do not apply. 14  Second, courts evaluate the
state's penological purposes as a component of Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis. When a defendant challenges a sentence as
11 I discuss the development of the constitutional law of punishment at the beginning of
Part III. Capital punishment has been regulated under the Eighth Amendment for over thirty
years, but doctrinal regulations of non-capital punishments have taken longer to develop.
See infra Part III; ef Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 1049 (2004) (addressing the constitutional restrictions on disproportionate
punishment); Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 512-14 (2004) (suggesting that several recent Supreme Court
decisions provide a basis for a "new constitutional law of crime and punishment").
12 See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND
BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org
/uploadedFiles/8015PCTSPrison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf (presenting data on
rising incarceration rates). As for the death penalty, it was the focus of two of the Supreme
Court's most publicized decisions* in the October 2007 tenm. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128
S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is an unconstitutionally severe
punishment for the crime of child rape); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532-34 (2008)
(announcing the constitutional standard to evaluate challenges to methods of execution, and
finding that Kentucky's lethal injection protocol satisfies that standard).
13 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (noting the importance of
recognizing state's "penological goal"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)
(noting that prison conditions may violate the Eighth Amendment if they fail to serve any
"penological purpose").
14 See infra Part III.A.
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excessive and thus "cruel and unusual," courts will inquire into the state's
purposes in punishing to decide whether the sentence is in fact too severe.15
Finally, official intentions matter in the analysis of Eighth Amendment
challenges to prison conditions or uses of force within prison. A prisoner
challenging the conditions of his confinement must show that prison
officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to serious deprivations, and a
prisoner alleging excessive force must show that prison officials acted with
sadistic or malicious intent. 16
In practice, then, the success or failure of a constitutional challenge to
punishment often depends on an assessment of official intent. Usually, it is
failure; successful constitutional challenges to punishment are very rare. To
understand this result, I suggest, we must appreciate the imprecision-what
has been called the "slop"-of determinations of intent. 17  When an
observer or fact-finder assesses the intent of another individual or of an
institution, there is nearly always room for interpretation. The punitive or
penological purposes of a legislature, and even the mental state of a
particular prison official, can usually be presented at the time of litigation in
a way that avoids constitutional offense. It is very difficult for individual
litigants to prove convincingly the subjective mental states required to
establish a constitutional violation.18 Evidentiary ambiguities allow for
discretionary judgment, and courts have considerable leeway to find the
requisite intent (or not) in order to reach a preferred outcome.
Thus, there is a second sense in which we are of many minds about
states of minds: in any particular case, you and I may have different
assessments of a third person's state of mind. This observation is not a
claim of epistemic futility-it is not that "we just can't know" intentions,
and so any effort to determine them is hopeless. Rather, it is a call for
honesty about epistemic limitations and the opportunities they produce. In
a famous philosophical study of intention, Elizabeth Anscombe argued that
claims about an individual's intentions could be verified by an external
observer, but only "up to a point."' 19 Eventually, "there comes a point at
which the skill of psychological detectivcs has no criteria for its own
success." 20 This claim about individual intentions has even greater force
when applied to institutional intentions, since the very concept of
"s See infra Part III.B.
16 See infra Part III.C.
17 Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the Border of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope
ofAgent-Relative Restrictions, 27 L. & PHIL. 35, 51 (2008).
" See infra Part III.
19 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 43 (2d ed. 1963).
21 Id. at 48.
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institutional intention already entails the attribution of intention to the
institution. We can and do make claims about what a person, or
corporation, or legislature, intended; the point here is simply that in making
those claims, we rely on normative and often contested judgments.2"
As we identify a constitutional law of punishment, then, we might also
find occasion for critical reflection on its emphasis on state intentions.
Such reflection is the second, and broader, purpose of this Article. Of
particular interest is a growing body of philosophical literature that
questions whether an actor's intentions determine the moral permissibility
of his action.22 This work in philosophy stands in stark contrast to the
discussions of government motives in constitutional theory, where most
scholars have accepted the premise that motives are relevant to
constitutionality.23 This Article brings the arguments from these two
disciplines together in order to evaluate the role of state intentions in the
law of punishment. This evaluation reveals that many of the constitutional
theorists' arguments in defense of motive analysis in First or Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence are inapplicable or unpersuasive in the context
of state punishment. At the same time, many of the philosophers' reasons
to deny the normative significance of intentions are especially powerful in
the context of state punishment. Together, these literatures suggest some
grounds for caution about motive analysis in the law of punishment. In
practice, the emphasis on state intentions has given courts that are
sympathetic to state agencies, and unsympathetic to prisoners, an
opportunity to ensure that most constitutional challenges to punishment fail.
Notwithstanding the development of a constitutional law of punishment that
could serve to limit the power to punish, the courts have chosen a
deferential approach and penal practices have been left relatively
unregulated.
Doctrinal standards that focus more on objective factors and less on
the state's intentions might ensure somewhat more meaningful regulation of
punishment; this Article notes the standards that seem most ripe for reform.
However, adjustments to doctrine, standing alone, are unlikely to transform
the constitutional law of punishment into the strong limitation on state
power that many observers might like it to be. We probably cannot
eliminate all inquiries into state intentions, and it is not clear that we would
want to do so. It is nonetheless useful to identify and scrutinize the
21 Cf Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REV. 591, 603-05, 620-33 (1981) (describing various arational "interpretive
constructions" deployed in the law to assess individuals' volition or intent).
22 See infra Part IV.B.
23 See infra Part IV.A.
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doctrines of state intentions: this endeavor helps us see what these doctrines
can, and cannot, accomplish. Ultimately, awareness of the limitations of
motive-based constitutional doctrines may simply provide an incentive to
explore other avenues of criminal justice reform.
This Article proceeds in four major parts. Part II identifies some key
points of reference, distinguishing different roles that assessments of intent
play in legal analysis. The aim is not to be comprehensive, but to place in
the foreground some features of intent analysis that will help clarify the
constitutional law of punishment. Part III turns to constitutional doctrine,
tracing the three primary areas in which state intentions matter to the
regulation of punishment. Part IV examines an array of explicitly
normative arguments concerning whether and why intentions should matter
to the legal or moral permissibility of an action, and Part V applies those
arguments to the constitutional doctrines that regulate punishment.
II. POINTS OF REFERENCE
Intent standards are everywhere in the law: in criminal mens rea
categories; in civil tort claims; in antidiscrimination statutes; in the tax code
and many administrative regulations; in the canons of interpretation applied
to statutes, contracts, and other legal texts; and of course, in several areas of
constitutional doctrine. A full taxonomy of legal intent standards is a
project too large for one article, but fortunately the task here is less onerous.
A few general observations about the role of intention in legal analysis will
set the stage for a study of the constitutional law of punishment. The aim is
simply to organize the familiar, and to do so in a way that will illuminate
the remainder of my analysis.
A. INTERPRETATION AND CLASSIFICATION DISTINGUISHED
There are many ways that the law uses assessments of individual or
collective intention, two of which are important here. First, intention is
sometimes relevant to the task of textual interpretation: the meaning of a
legal text-a contract, a will, a statute, a constitutional provision-may be
determined with reference to the intentions of the person or persons who
produced the text. Second, intention may also be relevant to the evaluation
and classification of an action. For example, the classification of killing as
murder, manslaughter, or justified self-defense (or something else) requires
a determination of the killer's intent.
A seminal case illustrates both roles for intention, and invokes
Holmes's dog to boot. In Morissette v. United States,24 the Supreme Court
24 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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considered a federal statute that provided for fines or imprisonment for any
individual who "embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts"
25government property. Joseph Morissette, a scrap iron collector, was
prosecuted and convicted under the statute after removing spent bomb
casings from an "uninhabited... and sparsely populated" area.26 Though
Morissette admitted that he took the casings, he maintained that he believed
them to be abandoned property and did not intend to steal.2 7 The issue,
then, was whether the phrase "knowingly converts" implicitly required
proof of wrongful intent.
That question required the Court to interpret the statute, and to do that,
it addressed a prior question of congressional intent. In other words, the
Court could not say whether Morissette's intentions were relevant to the
classification of his conduct as criminal until it first consulted legislative
intentions. In its search for legislative intent, the Court noted that Congress
acted in the context of "the ancient requirement" that criminal punishment
could be imposed only upon proof of "a culpable state of mind., 2' The
Court concluded that given the historical tradition of culpability
requirements, it would not assume that Congress intended to eliminate such
requirements, absent clear evidence of such intent. 29 The Court read the
phrase "knowingly converts" to require not only that the defendant knew he
was taking property, but also that the defendant knew he was converting
property. 30 That is, the Court interpreted the statute to require proof that the
defendant knew the property he was taking was owned by someone else.
The interpretive question-what Congress intended-was resolved in favor
of an implicit requirement of proof of the defendant's culpable intent. The
classificatory question-whether Morissette's action was "knowing
conversion" as prohibited by statute-then required an analysis of
Morissette's intent. Without proof of culpable intent, Morissette's
conviction was reversed.31
A coda adds one more twist. Subsequent cases depicted Morissette as
standing for a constitutional requirement that a criminal statute may not
25 Id. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000)).
26 Id. at 247-48.
27 Id. at 248-49.
28 Id. at 250. To illustrate this longstanding rule, the Court recalled Holmes's "pithy
observation" that "[e]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked." Id. at 252 n.9.
29 Id. at 263.
30 Id. at 270-71.
31 Id. at 276. The Court rejected the government's argument that as a matter of law, the
act of taking the casings should allow a presumption of wrongful intent. Id. at 273-74.
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presume wrongful intent.32  Such a presumption violates the due process
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which require the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
charged offense.33  This rule means that the interpretation of a statute's
mens rea provisions (which, again, may call for an analysis of legislative
intent) can be determinative of the classification of that statute as
constitutional or not. As a fact-finder judging a defendant might assess his
intent in order to classify his acts as criminal, so a court judging a due
process challenge to a statute might assess legislative intent in order to
understand the meaning of the statute and classify it as constitutional.
One could think of the constitutional law of punishment as conduct
rules for the legislatures that authorize punishment and the law enforcement
officials that impose it.34  As courts classify legislative or enforcement
action as constitutional or not, they refer to the intentions of the public
officials involved. But questions of interpretation matter as well. When
confronting a constitutional challenge to legislation, courts are sometimes
required to interpret legislation in order to determine its constitutionality.
Keeping the distinction in mind will be useful, especially when these two
roles of intent appear simultaneously.
B. INTENTIONS ARE PLURAL, NOT BINARY
Like many maxims, Holmes's quip about dogs offers brevity at the
price of oversimplification. Dogs may distinguish only between kicks and
stumbles, but the law makes much more nuanced distinctions.35 When
32 See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523-24 (1979); United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
33 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-700 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.").
34 Cf Carol Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470 (1996) ("[A]s any teacher of both
substantive and procedural criminal law knows, constitutional criminal procedure is a
species of substantive criminal law for cops."). On "conduct rules," see Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in the Criminal Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 625, 627 (1984).
35 As some commentators have noted, it is doubtful whether dogs even do distinguish
between kicks and stumbles. "In claiming that 'even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked' Justice Holmes demonstrated his limited knowledge of the
canine world." Schauer, supra note 4, at 197 (footnote omitted); see also Adam Kolber,
Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54
STAN. L. REV. 163, 163 (2001) (noting that Holmes's claim is not usually considered "an
empirical statement about the abilities of dogs").
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intentions are used to classify actions, it matters not only whether an action
was intentional, but what the actor's specific motivation was. Put
differently, the law would not only differentiate an intentional kick from an
unintentional stumble, but would also distinguish among kicks on the basis
of the specific intentions that motivate them. A wake-up kick intended to
move a sleeping dog out of the path of an oncoming steamroller would be
treated differently from a kick intended as deserved punishment for biting,
chewing, or some other doggie offense; and both would be treated
differently from a kick intended only to hurt, administered out of sheer
cussedness. In law, there are usually more than two categories of relevant
intention.
Five general mental state categories are applicable in various areas of
the law.36 From most serious or wrongful to least serious, these five
categories are: purpose, knowledge or belief, recklessness, negligence, and
strict liability.37 The first four categories correspond to the categories of
mens rea identified by the Model Penal Code and employed in the criminal
codes of many American jurisdictions.38 Most criminal codes also include
a threshold voluntary act requirement, which might be understood as the
minimum level of intent: a voluntary act is nothing more than willed
physical movement.
3 9
Intention can be sliced much finer still. In the criminal law, specific
intent offenses impose liability only on defendants who act with some
specially identified purpose: those who commit assault with intent to cause
great bodily injury, for example, or those who kill for pecuniary gain.40 As
interpreted by the Court, the federal statute at issue in Morissette v. United
States is a specific intent offense. It was not enough that Joseph Morissette
voluntarily took the bomb casings; the statute required proof that he took
36 Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 465 tbl. 1 (1992).
37 Id. Simons proposes an alternative, more complex matrix with additional mental
states. Id. at 465 tbl.2.
38 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1980); see also Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of
Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 815 (1980) (suggesting that the
concepts of culpability in the Model Penal Code may be the "most significant and enduring
achievement" of the drafters).
39 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01; MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 46 (1993) ("[B]efore one
can be punished for any crime whatsoever, one must have performed some simple bodily
movement caused by one's volition .... ). But see Francisco Munoz-Conde & Luis Ernesto
Chiesa, The Act Requirement as a Basic Concept of Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2461, 2470-76 (2007) (proposing a communicative theory of action as an alternative to a
theory of action as "'willed bodily movement').
40 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(e) (3d ed. 2000).
1362 [Vol. 98
2008] STATE INTENTIONS AND THE LAW OF PUNISHMENT
them with the specific intent to deprive someone else of her property. 4'
Similarly, several criminal law defenses eliminate or mitigate the criminal
liability of defendants who act for particular purposes.42 In constitutional
law, certain government motivations are subjected to greater scrutiny or
prohibited outright. For example, a state's "purposeful or deliberate"
exclusion of Blacks from juries violates the Equal Protection Clause.43 Any
legal burden on religious practices that is motivated by religious prejudice
will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 4 In short, a binary classification
of actions as either intentional or accidental is too simplistic to capture all
the ways in which intentions are legally relevant. Even among intentional
actions, we can draw further distinctions based on the narrow and specific
purposes of the actor.45 As will become clear, these more nuanced
categories of intention introduce evidentiary challenges as well as complex
philosophical questions.
C. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES AND NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS
Whether intentions are invoked to interpret a text or to classify an
action, we need to know what the relevant party's intentions were. This
determination is difficult in any context; a person's intentions do not appear
on her forehead in bold print.46 Determining intent may be particularly
difficult when the relevant parties are long deceased (like the drafters of the
U.S. Constitution) or composite actors (such as legislatures or
corporations). The question, then, is how to ascertain intention, and on the
basis of what evidence? The assessment of intention is itself an interpretive
exercise that calls for normative, and contested, judgments.
Direct evidence of intention is rare, and the predominant means of
proving intention is circumstantial evidence.47 Certain presumptions also
41 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 270-71 (1952).
42 For example, self-defense claims require proof that the defendant acted in order to
preserve herself from death or great bodily harm, and with a reasonable belief that the victim
posed an immediate danger. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 5.7(d).
43 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
203-04 (1965)).
44 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
45 Even within the category of accidents, we draw distinctions, such as that between
gross negligence and mere negligence.
46 As Deborah Denno recently noted with respect to mental states, "How odd for a legal
system to base so much on something about which it seems to know so little." Deborah W.
Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 601, 605 (2005).
47 For example, the purchase of a life insurance policy for one's spouse is classic
circumstantial evidence of intent to kill the spouse; employer hostility toward women may
serve as circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory firing in the employment context. See,
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operate to facilitate the determination of intent. For example, we tend to
presume that an individual intended "the natural and probable
consequences" of her actions, so that one who stabs a victim multiple times
is usually thought to have intended to kill notwithstanding her protests to
the contrary.48 Though, as we know from Morissette, jurors may not be
required to presume intent as a matter of law, it is permissible to instruct
them that they are free to conclude, in light of the circumstantial evidence,
that the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of her
actions.49
For the most part, fact-finders appear comfortable making mental state
determinations for individual defendants, even with only circumstantial
evidence. Indeed, they may trust their own judgments about what a
defendant intended more than they trust the defendant's own direct
statements of intent. The defendant obviously has an incentive to deny that
she possessed any mental state that is an element of the offense. Jurors lack
similar incentives to misrepresent mental states, but even well-intentioned
e.g., State v. Smith, 77 P.3d 984, 987 (Id. Ct. App. 2003) ("A finding of criminal intent may
be based upon circumstantial evidence .... A defendant's intent may be inferred from his
acts and conduct .. "); Parks v. Commonwealth, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (Va. 1980) (noting
that in some cases, circumstantial evidence is "practically the only method of proof' of
intent); see also 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 242 (Chadboum rev. 1979) ("[T]here is no special
evidence of intent... apart from evidence of emotion, of knowledge, of design .... So if
one is charged with wife murder, his ill feelings toward the wife would be an ingredient of
criminal intent, and whatever evidence would be otherwise suitable to show motive (i.e., ill
feeling) would be receivable .... ); cf LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 3.5(f), at 241 (noting that
at the time of a crime, the defendant "does not often contemporaneously speak or write out
his thoughts for others to hear or read," nor does the defendant usually admit later to having
had the requisite criminal intent).
48 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 986 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) ("The trier of fact
is allowed to draw upon his own common knowledge and experience to infer intent from the
circumstances. Because of the difficulty in ascertaining a person's intent, a presumption
exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts." (citation
omitted)).
49 Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-25 (1985) (finding a jury instruction that "[tihe
acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the products of the
person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted" to reallocate the burden of proof from
prosecution to defense to violate the Due Process Clause); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 523-24 (1979).
50 Even though direct evidence of the defendant's intent is rarely available, see supra
note 47, juries nonetheless convict in a significant majority of criminal trials. See Neal
Vidmar et al., Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury? Consider Conviction Rate
Data, 80 JUDICATURE 286, 287 (1995) (reporting jury conviction rate of 82% for non-drug
federal offenses and 87% for drug offenses); id. at 288-89 (reporting conviction rates of
58.9 %-84% in state jury trials). Of course, mental state determinations are not critical to all
trials, and even where mental state is an issue, a conviction does not tell us exactly how
jurors make assessments of intent.
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jurors may be poorly equipped to read the defendant's mind. Empirical
research on juries indicates that they bring considerable background
knowledge into their deliberative processes, and that they fit together the
factual evidence presented at trial into a narrative that makes sense given
their background knowledge. 51 The opacity of the human mind means that
fact-finders are typically making guesses about an individual's mental state,
but this is a necessity that the criminal law accepts with little fanfare.
The point here is simply that courts and juries regularly make
determinations of individuals' intentions without too much handwringing; I
do not claim that these determinations are "accurate." Indeed, I share
Christopher Slobogin's view that "[e]xcept at the margin, assessing the
relative 'accuracy' of such normative judgments [mental state
determinations] is an oxymoronic exercise., 52 The claim "she intended to
be cruel" is simply not the same sort of claim as "she slapped him."
Michael Moore has recently put the point more colloquially: a judgment
that an individual acted with a particular intention is one that "inevitably
will have some slop in it."' 53  It seems likely that jurors perceive the
inevitable moral judgment in assessments of intention, and they may be
more comfortable determining intent for precisely that reason. Scrutinizing
the mind and discovering its secrets is a sophisticated task for experts, but
attributing fault is something every layman knows how to do.
The normative, discretionary nature of intent assessments means that
intent standards offer points of flexibility in the law. When a decision-
maker has a strong intuition in favor of a particular outcome,
determinations of intent can serve as the mechanism by which the preferred
outcome is achieved. As an illustration, consider a rare recording of an
actual jury deliberation in a state criminal trial. 4 The defendant had been
51 See Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a
Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1216-31 (1998)
(describing jury decision-making and summarizing empirical research); Kevin Jon Heller,
The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-i 155304 (arguing that jurors tend to use projection or
prototyping to make mens rea judgments).
52 Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case Study,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 919, 945 (2000). Recall Elizabeth Anscombe's claim, quoted in
my Introduction: "[T]here comes a point at which the skill of psychological detectives has no
criteria for its own success." ANSCOMBE, supra note 19, at 48. Insofar as we can assess the
accuracy of mens rea findings, there is reason to believe that jury findings are not very
accurate. See Heller, supra note 51, at 34-60.
53 Moore, supra note 17, at 50-51.
54 I take this account of Wisconsin v. Reed from Brown, supra note 51. The deliberations
were broadcast on PBS. See FRONTLINE: INSIDE THE JURY ROOM (PBS television broadcast
Apr. 8, 1986).
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charged under Wisconsin's very simple weapon possession statute; the
prosecution needed to establish only that the defendant had a prior felony
conviction, possessed a gun, and knew that he possessed the gun. 55 The
jurors initially agreed that the elements had been "technically" proven, but
expressed reluctance to convict: the defendant was sympathetic, and the
crime was not vicious or harmful.56 To "find room in the law," in the
words of one juror, the jury eventually focused on the statute's mens rea
requirement that the defendant "knew" he possessed a weapon. 57 Aware of
the defendant's considerable mental disabilities, the jury eventually
construed "to know" in very narrow terms and voted to acquit.58 The jurors
appear to have reasoned backward from an intuitively just outcome to the
necessary mental state determination that would dictate that outcome.
Importantly for constitutional law, intent standards are no less-and
possibly more-flexible when collective intention is at stake.
Determinations of collective intention are always constructions: the court or
fact-finder may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence when available,
but the very notion of collective intention requires some degree of
extrapolation from the facts.59 Put differently, an assessment of legislative
motive is "a construct synthesized from the text, context, operation, and
public meaning of the statute.,, 60 The assessment of a collective entity's
55 See Brown, supra note 51, at 1199.
56 Id. at 1240. The defendant was mentally impaired with a second-grade reading level.
Id. at 1239-40. He had ordered the gun with the hope to take a mail-order course and
become a private detective. Id. He told a police officer about his plan, and the officer asked
him to get the gun and bring it to the police department. Id. The defendant did so and was
then arrested. Id.
"7 Id. at 1245.
58 id.
59 This is true both of corporate intent inquiries in criminal law, see William S. Laufer,
Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 704 (1994) (discussing
"constructive corporate liability"), and of legislative or government intent inquiries in
constitutional law, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520-21, 1524-25 (2000). See also
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1155
(2003) (discussing "objective constructions of intention").
60 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 493, 516 (2003). There is, of course, a vast literature on how to determine the
intentions of collective bodies-and whether such intentions exist. For my purposes, what is
most important about this literature is that among those who agree that it is reasonable to
speak of collective intentions, even those who characterize collective intentions as a "fact"
also acknowledge that intentions must be "ascribed to" or "attributed to" the collective by
some interpreting observer. See, e.g., ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL
THEORY 120 (2d ed. 2005) (describing legislative intention as "a matter of fact"); id. at 122
(arguing that the rules of collective institutions enable us to attribute intentions to them); id.
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intentions, like the assessment of individual intention, always leaves room
for normative judgment.61 Indeed, many controversies over collective
intention in legal analysis seem motivated less by a philosophical desire to
get our conceptual descriptions "right" than by disputes over which
intentions should be attributed to particular institutions. As we examine
constitutional doctrine in more detail, we will see that cases often turn on an
assessment of government intention that the given court easily could have
made differently.
Much more could be said about the role of intentions in legal analysis.
For purposes of this Article, however, these general observations will
suffice. First, intentions may be relevant to the interpretation of legal texts,
or they may be relevant to the classification of conduct. Some cases require
both types of intent analysis. Second, the dog's distinction between kicks
and stumbles, if taken literally, is too simple. The law recognizes not
simply a binary distinction between intentional and unintentional action, but
a much more complex array of relevant mental states. Finally, determining
intention is an imprecise activity that necessarily involves normative
judgment. With these points of reference in mind, consider the
constitutional doctrine that regulates criminal punishment in the United
States.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF PUNISHMENT
For at least half a century, scholars have called for more robust
constitutional restrictions on substantive criminal law.62 They have argued
at 124 ("Attributing shared intentions to a group is not a purely quantitative matter of
counting .... ).
61 This fact has not been lost on critics of some aspects of constitutional motive analysis.
For example, the Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence assesses whether state
action, as perceived by an "objective observer," is intended to promote or suppress religion.
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (explaining that courts determine
government purpose through the eyes of an "objective observer," focusing on "readily
discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts"). Justice
Scalia criticized this approach in dissent:
[Il]t is an odd jurisprudence that bases the unconstitutionality of a government practice that
does not actually advance religion on the hopes of the government that it would do so. But that
oddity pales in comparison to the one invited by today's analysis: the legitimacy of a government
action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the misperception of an imaginary
observer ....
Id. at 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
62 See, e.g., Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the
Substantive Criminal Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legislative Intervention, 55
TEX. L. REV. 269, 297-301 (1977); Dubber, supra note 11, at 509-16; Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 409-12 (1958); Herbert L.
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for limits on both the scope of the criminal law (that is, what may be
criminalized) and the severity of punishment.63  For the most part, the
scholars' wishes have remained unfulfilled. Nevertheless, in recent years
courts have increasingly confronted questions about whether, and how, the
Constitution restricts the power to impose punishment. In answering those
questions, the courts have developed a constitutional law of punishment.
This area of law is not nearly as intricate as the doctrines surrounding the
First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and many other
constitutional provisions, but it is one with several identifiable and related
constitutional rules.
The constitutional law of punishment has developed through a number
of different kinds of cases. First, the Supreme Court "constitutionalized"
capital punishment in the 1970s by holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment created both procedural and
substantive limits on death sentences. 64  The capital punishment cases
reinvigorated the notion that the Eighth Amendment contained an implicit
proportionality requirement, and the Court began to encounter
proportionality challenges to non-capital sentences. 65 The second half of
Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive
Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 494-95 (1970); William J. Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 29-38 (1996).
63 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 62, at 297-301 (setting forth the basic principles of a
proportionality test as a constitutional limitation on punishment); Hart, supra note 62, at 431
("Despite the unmistakable indications that the Constitution means something
definite.., when it speaks of 'crime,' the Supreme Court of the United States has hardly got
to first base in working out what that something is.").
64 In 1972, the Court invalidated the death penalty as it was then administered. Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1972). Four years later, it sustained a revised Georgia
death penalty statute in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). The two cases initiated
a capital punishment jurisprudence that focuses mainly on death sentencing procedures, see,
e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-77 (1983) (requiring capital sentencing procedures
that guide discretion by "genuinely narrow[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty"), but also contains some substantive restrictions on who may be put to death, see,
e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits execution of defendants who committed crimes as juveniles); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution as
penalty for adult rape). See also Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?
Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1992) (book review) ("[D]ecisions regarding the imposition of the death penalty are
'constitutionalized'....").
65 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-31 (2003) (challenge to 25-50-year
sentence under California's three strikes law); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-66
(1991) (plurality opinion) (challenge to mandatory life sentence for first-time possession of
cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 280-82 (1983) (challenge to life without parole for
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the twentieth century also saw federal courts use the Constitution,
especially the Eighth Amendment, to protect prisoners' rights and to impose
restrictions on the conditions within prisons.66  Still another set of
constitutional questions arose from the increasing prevalence of "hybrid"
sanctions, classified as civil, but seemingly very similar to criminal
penalties. 67 Because many constitutional provisions apply only to criminal
punishment, challenges to hybrid sanctions required courts to address what
counts as punishment for constitutional purposes. Finally, and most
recently, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial restricts the procedures under which sentences can be
determined.68
These collections of cases make up the constitutional law of
punishment. And like other areas of constitutional law, this one is rife with
references to the intentions of state actors. This Part examines the role of
state intentions in three contexts: the threshold determination of whether
state action is punishment; Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis; and
Eighth Amendment evaluations of conditions or violent incidents within
prisons. 69 Throughout the constitutional law addressing the imposition and
writing bad check); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264-66 (1980) (challenge to life
sentence for three thefts totaling $230).
66 Courts' responses to prisoners' claims evolved from the early American doctrine that
the prisoner was a "slave of the state" without enforceable rights, Ruffin v. State, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871), to a "hands-off' doctrine that recognized some minimal protections,
but was largely deferential to prison administrators, to evaluation of prisoners' constitutional
claims under a "reasonableness" standard. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05
(1974) (describing the hands-off doctrine); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)
("Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution."); id. at 89 (setting forth reasonableness standard for evaluation of prisoners'
constitutional claims). Many of the early federal decisions came during the civil rights
movement and addressed racially discriminatory prison practices. See, e.g., Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (holding that racial segregation in Alabama prisons
violates equal protection).
67 See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370-75 (1986) (holding that statutory
commitment of sex offenders was not sufficiently punitive to trigger Fifth Amendment
protection against compelled self-incrimination); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 165-66 (1963) (holding that nominally civil deprivation of citizenship was sufficiently
punitive to require the criminal due process protections of the Constitution). On the
increasing prevalence of "hybrid" sanctions, see Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and
Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775,
792-94 (1997).
68 See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
69 In this Article, I do not address at length the recent Sixth Amendment cases regulating
sentencing procedures. But as I argue elsewhere, some of those decisions do reflect
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administration of punishment, the state's intentions can make the difference
between a constitutional violation and a permissible use of the penal power.
A. INTENT TO PUNISH
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
is the most visible constitutional regulation of punishment, but it is not the
only one. Various procedural protections, including the prohibitions on ex
post facto laws and bills of attainder in Article I, as well as the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, effectively restrict the manner in
which the state exercises its power to punish. For these constitutional
restrictions to apply, the state action in question must be properly
characterized as "punishment," or in some cases, even more narrowly as
"criminal punishment., 70  Whether state action constitutes criminal
punishment is an inquiry that begins with the state's intentions: when the
state imposed the burden or liability at issue, did it intend to punish? Or, to
use the Supreme Court's term of art, did the state have "punitive intent"? 7I
Recent laws targeted at sex offenders have generated a series of cases
in which the parties contest the punitive character of the state action.72
concerns about the substantive severity of criminal sentences. See Alice Ristroph,
Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DuKE L.J. 263, 320-22 (2005).
70 The doctrine gets a bit complicated because the Eighth Amendment is the only one of
these various constitutional provisions that actually uses the term "punishment." The
Supreme Court has recognized a category of "civil punishment" and applied the Eighth
Amendment to civil forfeitures. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 & n.6 (1993).
The Bill of Attainder Clause also applies only to "punishment," Nixon v. Admin. Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 468-71 (1977), but in that context "punishment" need not be criminal, United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). For other constitutional provisions, the question
has often been framed as whether the punishment being imposed is criminal. See Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98-100 (1997) ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit
the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as
punishment. The Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal
punishments for the same offense." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369-71 (1997) (rejecting double jeopardy and ex post facto
challenges on grounds that the challenged law did not impose criminal punishment). The
privilege against self-incrimination, the due process requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and Sixth Amendment protections are also limited to criminal cases.
71 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69. As will become clear, "punitive intent" is to
be distinguished from another term used by the Court, "penological purpose." Penological
purpose refers to the goals or desired ends of punishment, not the mere intent to punish. For
more on penological purpose, see infra Part III.B.
72 A second set of examples, which I do not discuss in the text, are cases involving
constitutional challenges to conditions of confinement brought by pre-trial detainees. Since
the detainees are not yet convicted and sentenced, a question arises as to whether their
conditions of confinement may be labeled "punishment" for purposes of constitutional
analysis. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (deciding, in the context of a Fifth
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Consider Leroy Hendricks: on the eve of his scheduled release from prison
for sex offenses, Kansas passed the Sexually Violent Predator Act, which
established procedures for the indefinite commitment of sex offenders
designated "sexually violent predators," and promptly committed Hendricks
under the new law.73 When Hendricks challenged the law on double
jeopardy and ex post facto grounds, Kansas argued that the law did not
impose criminal punishment and thus neither of these constitutional
provisions applied. 7
To decide whether the constitutional restrictions on punishment apply
to a sanction not clearly labeled as criminal, courts look to legislative intent.
This inquiry is "first of all a matter of statutory construction., 75  If the
relevant statute reveals a clear intent to impose criminal punishment, the Ex
Post Facto Clause and other constitutional restrictions on punishment apply.
If the manifest legislative intent is not punitive-if, for example, the law's
preamble cites a concern for public safety and the law is codified in the civil
code-courts will go on to ask "whether the statutory scheme is so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it
civil."' 76  To analyze the punitive effects of a law, courts may consider
several factors, including whether the sanction involved an affirmative
Amendment due process challenge to "double-bunking" of pretrial detainees, that "the
proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment"); id. at 538 ("A court
must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is
but an incident of some other legitimate governmental objective."); Demery v. Arpaio, 378
F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a sheriffs use of webcams to stream live
images of pretrial detainees onto the Internet was "not reasonably related to a non-punitive
purpose" and thus constituted punishment).
73 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350-52 (describing the 1994 Act); id. at 353-54 (stating that
Hendricks was convicted in 1984, sentenced to ten years in prison, and originally scheduled
for release in 1994); id. at 367-68 (stating that Hendricks was the first person committed
under the Act).
74 Id. at 360-61. Hendricks also raised substantive due process arguments, which the
Supreme Court rejected. See id. at 356-60. Because I am interested in the state's use of
force, I focus on cases involving compelled physical confinement of sex offenders.
However, similar constitutional analysis has been applied to other burdens on sex offenders,
including registration requirements and residency restrictions. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 96 (2003) (upholding Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act); Doe v. Miller, 405
F.3d 700, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding Iowa law prohibiting those convicted of sex
offenses against minors from residing within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility);
Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding registration and
notification provisions of Washington sex offender statute).
15 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
76 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S.
at 361). This language reveals, albeit subtly, the extent to which collective intention is
constructed rather than "discovered." The Court's formulation allows for the possibility of a
law that lacks "manifest" punitive intent, but is nonetheless "punitive in purpose."
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disability or restraint; whether the sanction is historically associated with
criminal punishment; whether scienter or intent is required; whether the
sanction serves retributive or deterrent aims; whether the behavior for
which the sanction is imposed is already defined as a crime; whether the
sanction is rationally connected to an alternative, non-punitive purpose; and
whether the sanction is excessive in relation to that alternative purpose.77
Under current doctrine, these factors are "neither exhaustive nor
dispositive.,, 78 Emphasizing the Kansas legislature's intent to ensure public
safety by incapacitating dangerous sex offenders, the Hendricks Court
found that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was not "punishment"
for constitutional purposes.79
As it was originally stated in 1963 in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
and summarized in subsequent opinions, the punitiveness analysis requires
judicial scrutiny of both legislative purposes and statutory effects.80  The
statutory text is the starting point, but it is not the final arbiter of intention.
"[A] civil label is not always dispositive." 81 Indeed, the Mendoza-Martinez
approach to punitive intent contemplates the possibility of a disparity
between legislative intent as determined by statutory construction, on one
hand, and legislative intent as determined by a more complex analysis of
multiple factors, on the other. Moreover, legislative intent-however
ascertained-is not itself wholly determinative. The doctrine allows, in
theory, for a statute's effects to take precedence over its intent: a law
sufficiently "punitive in its effects" will be subject to constitutional
restrictions on punishment notwithstanding a manifest civil purpose. 2
77 This list of factors was originally set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-69 (1963). These factors are culled from cases addressing what counts as
punishment in several contexts--ex post facto, double jeopardy, bills of attainder, and the
Sixth and Eighth Amendments. Accordingly, "the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed
to apply in various constitutional contexts" and "are neither exhaustive nor dispositive, but
are useful guideposts." Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
78 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)).
79 The Court first noted that "commitment under the Act does not implicate either of the
two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence." Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 361-62. The Court then acknowledged that the state court had construed "the Act's
sole purpose [as] incapacitation," but argued that "incapacitation may be a legitimate end of
the civil law." Id. at 365-66; see also id. at 368-69 (concluding that the Act was non-
punitive).
80 "Purpose tests" and "effects tests" are, of course, frequently deployed in constitutional
doctrine, and the Eighth Amendment is not the only context in which the Court combines the
two sorts of inquiries. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 69-74.
81 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)).
82 Attempts to establish punitiveness through punitive effects may be difficult after Seling
v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). There, Andre Brigham Young brought double jeopardy and
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As applied, however, the Mendoza-Martinez test has rarely led courts
to find legislative intent to be anything other than what, at the time of
litigation, government lawyers claim it to be.83 The individual challenging
an allegedly punitive law has the burden to establish its punitive character
by "the clearest proof."84 This rigid evidentiary standard obscures the fact
that intentions, especially collective intentions, are not "proven," strictly
speaking, but only constructed. There is considerable room for
interpretation, especially when a decision-maker must classify an intention
expressed in one way (intent to incapacitate) as a member of a larger
category of intention (intent to punish).85 All observers may agree that the
Kansas law was intended to incapacitate, but it is far from clear that
incapacitation is an alternative to punishment, as opposed to a specific form
of it. The Hendricks majority cited retribution and deterrence as the
primary purposes of the criminal law, but in other contexts the preservation
of public safety via incapacitation is widely recognized as a goal of
punishment. 86  The process of constructing intent, and of classifying
intentions into legally relevant categories, necessarily involves normative
judgments.8 7
ex post facto challenges to a sex offender confinement statute very similar to the one
sustained in Hendricks. Young argued that given the restrictive conditions and indefinite
duration of his confinement, the confinement statute was clearly punitive in effect as applied
to him. Id. at 259-60, 262. The Supreme Court rejected the "punitive-as-applied" challenge
as categorically unworkable: since an individual offender's conditions of confinement are
likely to change over time, an as-applied analysis "would never conclusively resolve whether
a particular scheme is punitive." Id. at 263. The Court reserved the question whether it
might consider actual conditions of confinement to determine "in the first instance" if a
statute was civil or criminal. Id. at 266. The problem with Young's claim seemed to be that
he acknowledged the statute was civil in general, then argued it was punitive as applied to
him.
83 In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court found punitive intent underlying a federal statute that
deprived those who left the country to avoid military service of citizenship. Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1963). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions that
apply Mendoza-Martinez have consistently found the government practices in question not
to qualify as punishment. See Smith, 538 U.S. 84 (discussed supra note 74); Seling, 531
U.S. 250 (discussed supra note 82); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997);
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-51 (holding that monetary penalty for
oil pollution did not constitute punishment); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-41 (1979)
(finding that "double-bunking" of pretrial detainees did not constitute punishment).
84 See, e.g., Seling, 531 U.S. at 261.
85 For further elaboration, see infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
86 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62. In Ewing v. California, the Court identified
incapacitation as the intention underlying California's clearly punitive three strikes law. See
infra Part III.B.
87 See supra Part II.C.
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Which normative judgments were important to Kansas v. Hendricks?
The text of the majority opinion offers reason to believe that the outcome of
Hendricks was driven primarily by the Court's determination that the
appropriate response to sex offenders is a matter of legislative prerogative,
not to be second-guessed by the judiciary.88 If this reading is correct, the
discussion of punitive intent is best understood as a proxy for a principle of
deference to legislative choices. And despite the frequent claim that
"deference" manifests judicial abstention from the exercise of subjective
judgment, in the context of judicial review the choice to defer is a
normative choice. 89
Most of the cases involving a search for punitive intent have involved
constitutional provisions other than the Eighth Amendment. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court introduced something akin to a punitive intent
requirement to its Eighth Amendment capital punishment jurisprudence. 90
In Baze v. Rees, the Court interpreted the ban on cruel and unusual
punishments to proscribe only pain or harm that resulted from more than
mere negligence. Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling, prisoners facing
execution, argued that Kentucky's lethal injection procedures posed an
unnecessary and thus unconstitutional risk of accidental infliction of severe
pain. 9' The majority rejected this argument, borrowing from Eighth
Amendment decisions concerning prison conditions to conclude that only
exposure to "a substantial risk of serious harm" or an "objectively
intolerable risk of harm," neither of which was proven by the Kentucky
prisoners, could establish that state officials were sufficiently blameworthy
88 Justice Thomas's majority opinion contains several statements of deference to
legislative choices. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359 ("[W]e have never required state
legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes."); id.
at 360 n.3 ("We recognize ... that psychiatric professionals are not in complete harmony in
casting pedophilia, or paraphilias in general, as 'mental illnesses.' These disagreements,
however, do not tie the State's hands in setting the bounds of its civil commitment laws. In
fact, it is precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded the
widest latitude .... "); id. at 368 n.4 ("[Tihe States enjoy wide latitude in developing
treatment regimens.").
89 Paul Horwitz identifies two general reasons that courts might defer to a legislature or
some other decisionmaking entity: the legal authority of the deferee; and the "epistemic
authority," or superior knowledge, of the deferee. Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1061, 1078-90 (2008). But as becomes clear in Horwitz's
discussion, comparative epistemic advantage and the scope of legal authority are themselves
subject to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., id. at 1093-94; see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing professed deference to legislative
authority as a "hollow shibboleth" invoked to substitute for more substantive constitutional
analysis).
90 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
91 Id. at 1530.
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and thus that the Eighth Amendment had been violated. 92  Recalling
Holmes once more, we might understand the Court as holding that painful
executions, if too slight a risk, are mere stumbles. The Eighth Amendment,
by this reasoning, requires a kick.
9 3
As noted previously, various constitutional claims require a threshold
showing that the state action in question is punishment. What counts as
punishment is dependent, in turn, on the relevant state actor's (usually the
legislature's) punitive intent. But legislative intent is not an objective fact
that is plugged into a formalistic legal analysis; rather, it is a matter of
interpretation that demands normative judgment. As the Wisconsin jury
discussed above managed to reach an acquittal by declining to find that the
defendant "knew" he possessed a gun, a court can exempt legislative action
from the constitutional restrictions on punishment by declining to find
punitive intent.94
B. INTENT IN PUNISHING
Even when the state's general intent to punish is not questioned,
constitutional protections may vary depending on the specific reason for
which the state wishes to punish. Penological purposes, or the state's
intentions in punishing, are central to the Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis. In deciding whether a punishment is
disproportionately severe, and thus cruel and unusual, courts identify the
state's penological purposes and ask whether the punishment is excessive in
relation to those purposes.
The Supreme Court has based a handful of recent Eighth Amendment
decisions on assessments of penological purpose,95 but these assessments
were nowhere more critical than in Ewing v. California.96  In a well-
publicized challenge to California's three strikes law, Gary Albert Ewing
argued that a prison sentence of twenty-five years to life was
disproportionately severe, and thus cruel and unusual, when imposed for
92 Id. at 1530-31 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9 (1994)). For
more on the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of prisons, see infra Part III.C.
93 See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 ("[Aln isolated mishap alone does not give rise to an
Eighth Amendment violation, precisely because such an event, while regrettable, does not
suggest cruelty, or that the procedure at issue gives rise to a 'substantial risk of serious
harm.').
94 See supra text accompanying notes 54-5 8.
95 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 29-31 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002).
96 538 U.S. 11.
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shoplifting with a prior criminal record.9 7 A plurality of the Court agreed
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited "grossly disproportionate" sanctions,
but ultimately rejected Ewing's claim that his sentence was excessive in
relation to his crime. 98 The state's specific penological goals were a crucial
ingredient of the proportionality analysis: in order to determine whether a
sentence was disproportionate, or excessive, it was necessary to consider
what goal the sentence was intended to serve. 99 California had decided to
incapacitate repeat offenders by imposing long prison sentences, and, the
plurality reasoned, Ewing's effective life sentence was not excessive given
that specific purpose.' 00
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia set forth an even stronger
account of the importance of the state's penological purpose to the outcome.
He claimed that "[p]roportionality-the notion that the punishment should
fit the crime-is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution."' 10 ' On this reasoning, a state that imposes punishment for any
reason other than retribution is not subject to a proportionality requirement.
Justice Scalia argued that because the Eighth Amendment does not require
states to pursue retribution as a penological goal, the Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality principle whatsoever. 10 2 So far, no Supreme
Court majority has endorsed this claim that the variety of permissible
purposes of punishment eliminates any constitutional proportionality
requirement; the Ewing plurality insisted the Eighth Amendment contained
a "narrow proportionality principle" applicable to non-capital sentences. 1
03
One could view the inquiry into penological purpose as a mechanism
for judicial deference to the legislative branch, much as the inquiry into
punitive intent in Kansas v. Hendricks served deference to the legislature
there. In the Eighth Amendment proportionality context, courts take state
intentions into account so as not to interfere with them. 104 Put differently,
one could view the inquiry into penological purposes as an attempt to set a
17 Id. at 28-30.
98 Id. at 21, 30.
99 See id. at 24-27. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion reasoned that because "the
Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory," courts should defer
to legislative policy choices concerning the purposes of criminal sanctions. Id. at 25.
100 Id. at 29-30.
101 Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102 Id.; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.).
103 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20. However, any limitation on government power imposed by
this narrow proportionality principle may be effectively eliminated by the state's ability to
choose among broadly defined penological goals. See infra Part IV.B.
104 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-26, 29-30.
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baseline against which courts judge whether punishments are "excessive" or
not. In Ewing, for instance, the plurality implied indirectly, and Justice
Scalia suggested even more explicitly, that had California adopted its three
strikes law with the intent to impose "just deserts" in a retributive sense, the
appropriate punishment for shoplifting golf clubs may well have been less
severe. 105 Against a baseline determined by incapacitation as a goal,
however, the 25-50-year sentence was not excessive. Obviously, this
approach leaves the Eighth Amendment as a relatively weak restriction of
legislative power, since the legislature is permitted to select the baseline
against which its own acts will be judged. 106
On the particular facts of Ewing, it is not clear that the Supreme Court
was actually deferring to legislative purpose so much as simply endorsing
the mandatory sentence itself. A close reading reveals no evidence for the
proposition that the adoption of the three strikes law represented "a shift in
the State's sentencing policies" away from retribution. 10 7  Rather,
California had long taken the "kitchen sink" approach to penological
purposes, citing multiple goals at once. The preamble to the three strikes
law specifically identifies "ensur[ing] greater punishment" as one of the
many goals of the law, and the State's brief to the Supreme Court
emphasized that the long sentences were justified by the "enhanced
blameworthiness" and "aggravated. . . culpability" of the repeat
offender. 108 The notion that California had deliberately foregone retribution
in favor of other penological purposes was apparently introduced, with
some help from Justice Scalia, at oral argument.' 0 9 A better reading of
105 See id. at 25-26 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that "the Constitution 'does not
mandate adoption of any one penological theory,"' and attributing California's law to the
adoption of incapacitation and deterrence theories); id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(claiming that proportionality is an inherently retributive concept, and stating that the Ewing
plurality failed to "establish that 25-years-to-life is a 'proportionate' punishment for stealing
three golf clubs").
106 See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
107 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14.
108 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999); Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 8, 18,
21, Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (No. 01-6978). Furthermore, the political and popular discourse
surrounding the enactment of the law strongly emphasized "just deserts." See Alice
Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293,
1317 (2006) (collecting sources).
109 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (No. 01-6978)
("QUESTION: I would have thought your response ... would [be] that.., it depends on
what you want your penal goals to be. California has decided that disabling the criminal is
the most important thing .... QUESTION: ... If the objective ... is retribution, then, sure,
I guess it's disproportionate .... But if your purpose is disabling the criminal, I'm not sure
that [a life term for speeding tickets] is disproportionate."). For more details, see Ristroph,
supra note 108, at 1317-18 & nn.87-89.
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Ewing, then, may be that the intent inquiry simply served as a vehicle for a
normative judgment about the right outcome of the case. A majority of
Justices seem to have believed that California's law, and Gary Ewing's
sentence, was worth sustaining, and they were able to achieve this result
with their own distinctive interpretation of the state's penological purposes.
Critics of appeals to legislative intent in statutory interpretation argue that
because judges can always find evidence to support any professed intent,
legislative intent analysis actually serves as a vehicle for judges to enforce
their subjective policy preferences. If using legislative history is like
"looking over a crowd and picking out your friends," perhaps the same is
true of the appeals to penological purpose in Ewing. "0
Indeed, without an understanding of intent analysis as an opportunity
for normative judgment, it is difficult to reconcile the analysis of state
intentions in Hendricks and Ewing. Recall that in Hendricks, public safety
as a state purpose was viewed as evidence that long-term, indefinite
confinement was not punishment at all and not subject to ex post facto or
double jeopardy restrictions. In Ewing, public safety as a state purpose was
viewed as a rationale for punishment that rendered long-term, indefinite
confinement permissible under the Eighth Amendment. 1"' The cases are
clearly inconsistent in their assessments of the significance of public safety
as a motive for confinement. They are consistent, however, in that in each
case, the inquiry into state intentions appears to be a point of flexibility at
which the Court can give effect to a normative judgment about the right
outcome.
Assessments of the state's intentions in punishing have similarly
shaped several recent and controversial capital punishment decisions. In
Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that death sentences were
impermissible for any mentally retarded offenders, reasoning that the
Eighth Amendment banned "excessive" punishments," 12 including
punishments that fail to "measurably contribute" to a legitimate penological
purpose. 113 The Court concluded that death sentences for mentally retarded
offenders failed to "measurably advance the deterrent or retributive purpose
of the death penalty."' 1 4 It applied similar reasoning in Roper v. Simmons
to find the death penalty unconstitutional for any defendant who committed
11o See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (attributing this criticism of
judicial reliance on legislative history to Judge Harold Leventhal).
111 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2003).
113 Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
114 Id. at 321.
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his crime while still a juvenile 115 and in Kennedy v. Louisiana to find the
death penalty unconstitutional as punishment for child rape not resulting in
death. 116
On the surface, these capital cases turn more on a judgment about the
state's means than on one about ends or purposes. The critical finding in
each case is the Court's determination that capital punishment, as applied in
the particular case, is not an effective or necessary means to achieve
legitimate penological purposes. The Court's initial assessment of
penological purposes is nonetheless central to the outcome: were
incapacitation recognized as a legitimate purpose of capital punishment (as
it is a legitimate purpose of imprisonment in Ewing), it would be much
harder to conclude that executions of juveniles, mentally disabled offenders,
or child rapists failed to serve legitimate purposes. Furthermore, the very
judgment that the means fail to serve retributive or deterrent purposes is a
highly contested one. Whether the death penalty for this or that class of
offenders has deterrent effects is, in theory, subject to empirical
verification, but in practice researchers have reached little consensus on the
issue.1 17 And whether the death penalty serves retributive purposes is not
even pretended to be an empirical question. Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy
each produced vehement dissenting opinions that reasserted the retributive
value of capital punishment in the particular circumstances in question. 18
115 543 U.S. 551, 571-73 (2005).
116 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2661-62 (2008).
117 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 260-61 (2006) (listing flaws
in studies that purport to show the deterrent effects of the death penalty); Lawrence Katz et
al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318,
321-22 (2003) ("There simply does not appear to be enough information in the data on
capital punishment to reliably estimate a deterrent effect."); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence
Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's Differing Impact Among States, 104 MICH. L.
REv. 203, 204-07 (2005) (reporting empirical findings that capital punishment has a
deterrent effect in some states but a "brutalization" effect (increasing murder rates) in many
more states).
118 See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2675-77 (Alito, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 621
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's contention that the goals of retribution and deterrence
are not served by executing murderers under 18 is ... transparently false."); Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 350-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ristroph, supra note 108, at 1334-35 (discussing
the non-falsifiable character of claims of retribution).
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C. INTENT IN THE PRISON
A third context in which intentions matter to the law of punishment is
the regulation of prison itself. When conditions or events within prisons'' 9
are challenged as cruel and unusual punishment, courts assess the states of
mind of the prison officials involved. As a preliminary matter, note the
distinctive procedural context in which challenges to prison conditions
arise. The ex post facto, double jeopardy, and Eighth Amendment
proportionality claims discussed in Parts III.A and III.B are typically raised
as quasi-defenses in criminal litigation, that is, as arguments against
sentences imposed by the state. In those cases, the remedy sought is simply
not to be punished, or to be punished less severely. But Eighth Amendment
challenges to specific acts or conditions within prison are usually framed as
civil suits seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or as Bivens actions
against federal officials. 20 When Eighth Amendment claims are raised in
§ 1983 suits, courts are not trying to assess an institutional intent in the
sense of a legislative intent to punish or to pursue a given penological goal.
Rather, the intent inquiry is into the mental state of an identifiable
individual state actor (or several specific individuals) who may be
personally liable for a constitutional violation.' 21  Specifically, prisoner
119 1 am focusing on prison terms for already-convicted individuals. As noted above,
conditions of pretrial detention must first meet the threshold inquiry of punitive intent, or
else they are not considered punishment at all. See supra note 72.
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In § 1983 suits, there is a clearly identified
individual or group of individuals who both represent the state and bear personal liability for
any constitutional violation. Nominally, the question whether the individual state official
violated the Constitution is a question of fact for a jury. However, state officials sued under
§ 1983 nearly always invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity, which protects the official
from suit so long as her conduct does not violate "clearly established ... constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). Whether qualified immunity applies is a question of law, and one that courts decide
at the earliest possible stage of the litigation. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
589 (1998). In conducting qualified immunity analysis, courts end up effectively deciding
the factual questions, including those concerning the official's intentions, which would
otherwise go to a jury. So, it is appropriate to say here that courts, not jurors, assess prison
officials' states of mind. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY
L.J. 229, 232 (2006) ("The more [the Supreme Court] treats qualified immunity as a legal
question, and the less it acknowledges factual complexity, the better the Court can justify the
allocation of decision-making about officials' entitlement to qualified immunity to judges,
even where that might be inappropriate under ordinary rules of summary
judgment .... [The Court] is transferring the adjudication of civil rights claims toward
judges and away from juries.").
121 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994) (distinguishing the "search for a
subjective state of mind of a government entity" from the search for the state of mind of an
individual government official); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-30 (1991) (personal
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plaintiffs must show that prison officials acted with bad intentions-
"deliberate indifference" to grossly inadequate conditions or "malicious and
sadistic" intentions in using force. As in the other areas of the law of
punishment discussed above, the determinations of official intent offer
judges a chance to give effect to their normative preferences.
The applicable intent standard in these cases depends on the substance
of the prisoner's complaint. Challenges to conditions of confinement must
show that prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to known and
substantial deprivations of basic human necessities. 22  Deliberate
indifference requires that prison officials have actual knowledge of
substantial deprivations-such as grossly inadequate medical care-or
substantial risks of serious harm-such as credible threats from other
inmates-and that the officials fail to take reasonable measures to address
the known deprivations or risks.1 23 As the Supreme Court explained in
Farmer v. Brennan, the actual knowledge requirement is a higher threshold
than a civil recklessness standard (failure to act in face of an unjustifiable
risk of which the defendant knew or should have known), and is instead
equivalent to a criminal recklessness standard: "a person disregards a risk of
harm of which he is aware."
' 124
In a gesture similar to the preliminary inquiry of what constitutes
punishment, the Court reasoned that the criminal recklessness standard
more accurately reflected the intentionality implicit in the concept of
punishment. "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation,
cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.
1 25
In other words, negligent, but not deliberate, indifference 2 6 to the prisoners
under one's care is not properly called "punishment," and so does not fall
within the purview of the Eighth Amendment.
When a prisoner's Eighth Amendment complaint concerns a specific
use of force by a prison official rather than the conditions of his
liability); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 49-57 (1998) (providing an overview of § 1983 claims and the
doctrine of qualified immunity).
122 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1991). As noted above, the Supreme Court
recently adapted this "deliberate indifference" standard to evaluate the constitutionality of
methods of execution. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
123 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-42.
124 Id. at 837.
125 Id. at 838; see also id. at 837 ("The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and
unusual 'conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual 'punishments."').
126 The Farmer Court noted that deliberate indifference fell "between the poles of
negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other .. " Id. at 836.
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confinement, a different intent standard applies. In excessive force cases,
the question is whether the official used force "in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline[,] or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm." 12 7  The Court initially introduced this more
stringent malice standard as a necessary accommodation of the competing
interests at stake in prison disturbances. Though deliberate indifference to
ongoing inadequate conditions "can typically be established without the
necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns," the more complex
decision to use force requires prison officials "to take into account the very
real threats the unrest presents .... ,,28 Prison disturbances called for
greater deference to prison administrators, the Court reasoned. In this
particular context, "a deliberate indifference standard does not.., convey
the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made
in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second
chance." 129 Subsequently, the Court extended the "malicious and sadistic"
intent standard to all excessive force claims against prison officials, whether
the claims arose in the context of a disturbance or not. 130 Even as the Court
retained the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim, it also
specified objectively observable factors that could help judges make the
intent assessment. "[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate," "the need
for the application of force," "the amount of force used," the threat as
perceived by the officials, and "any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response" could all help a court decide whether a prison official
acted maliciously and sadistically. 131
Tellingly, the "malicious and sadistic" standard is characterized as a
"core judicial inquiry."' 32 It is almost always judges rather than jurors who
make factual findings about what prison officials intended. 33 This judicial
fact-finding has tended to favor prison officials. The existing doctrinal
formulation implies that good faith intentions to discipline and malicious
sadism are the only two possible mental states with which corrections
127 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
320-21 (1986)). Whitley introduced the "maliciously and sadistically" standard to govern
claims of excessive force in the specific context of responses to a prison disturbance, see 475
U.S. at 320-2 1, but Hudson extended this standard to all allegations of excessive force within
prison, see 503 U.S. at 7.
128 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
129 Id.
130 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
131 Id. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 See supra note 120.
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officers use force. 134 Without proof of malice or sadism, courts presume
that prison officials acted in good faith. 135 Of course, prison officials nearly
invariably claim that their uses of force were good faith efforts to maintain
order, and courts nearly invariably defer to these claims. 136  Though
circumstantial evidence is nominally a permissible way to prove that force
was used "wantonly" or maliciously, such evidence rarely persuades courts
deciding between prisoners' claims of excessive force and officers'
professions of good faith.137 A regular exception appears to be the case of
the prisoner who is badly beaten while in handcuffs or other restraints. 138
Otherwise, many excessive force claims falter on insufficient evidence of
malice or deliberate indifference. 1
39
Thus, in suits brought by prisoners, as in other areas of the
constitutional law of punishment, judicial inquiries into state intentions are
crucial and very often, outcome-determinative. Once again, the critical role
of intent standards must be understood as a vehicle for courts to exercise
134 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 ("[T]he question whether the measure taken inflicted
unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in
a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm." (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21) (emphasis added)).
135 See, e.g., Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 911-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(finding that correction officer who shot a prisoner who was being attacked by another
inmate may have acted negligently, but nevertheless acted in good faith rather than
maliciously or sadistically).
136 See, e.g., Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 350 n.14
(1981) (describing internal prison security as a matter within the discretion of prison
administrators); Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 911-13; Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (1 1th
Cir. 1991).
137 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (stating that relationship between need for force and
amount of force used, as well as extent of injury, may be considered to determine motive).
138 See, e.g., id. at 4, 9-10 (finding that prisoner stated Eighth Amendment claim after he
was beaten while handcuffed, shackled, and held in place by a second officer); Watts v.
McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that prisoner stated Eighth
Amendment claim by alleging being slammed into wall and kicked in groin while
handcuffed); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that prisoner stated
Eighth Amendment claim by alleging being beaten while handcuffed to a waist restraint belt
and in leg shackles); Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1440 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that
prisoner stated Eighth Amendment claim by alleging being beaten while naked and
shackled); cf Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (finding "obvious" Eighth
Amendment violation when prisoner was shackled to "hitching post" for hours without water
or bathroom break, and noting "[a]ny safety concerns had long since abated by the time
petitioner was handcuffed to the hitching post").
139 See, e.g., Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding
denial of prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim for failure to establish "deliberate
indifference," and noting that conduct constituting medical malpractice does not necessarily
establish deliberate indifference); see also supra notes 135-36.
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considerable discretion. There is substantial room for interpretation as to
what a specific individual prison official was thinking as a prisoner was
injured or mistreated, and even more room for interpretation when a court is
asked to assess the intentions of a collective entity such as a legislature or
executive agency.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY, MORALITY, AND INTENTION
The imprecision of intent analysis that we have seen in the law of
punishment is not unknown to other areas of constitutional doctrine. From
time to time, judges and scholars have suggested that government intentions
are unknowable, too easily misconstrued, or irrelevant. 140  Despite the
occasional complaints, government motives continue to drive much of
constitutional doctrine. 141  One very notable exception is Fourth
Amendment doctrine, which has repeatedly rejected inquiries into police
officers' subjective mental states in favor of objective "reasonable officer"
tests. 142 Somewhat incongruously, then, the pre-conviction use of force by
state officials in arrests and investigations is regulated primarily through
objective tests, while, as we have seen, the post-conviction use of force is
regulated by an array of subjective inquiries.
Outside of the Fourth Amendment, in First and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, motive analysis is so much taken for granted
today that only rarely do courts or commentators articulate why motives
matter. According to Richard Fallon, "The most familiar explanation of the
relevance of governmental purpose in constitutional law builds on Holmes's
aphorism that '[e]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and
being kicked."' 143 This is a lot of weight to put on a simple quip. 144 This
140 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610-11 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for striking down a law "essentially on the basis of 'its visceral
knowledge of what must have motivated the legislators"' (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 778
F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1985) (Gee, J., dissenting))); id. at 612-16 (critiquing "secular
purpose" as element of Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
141 This is so despite the Supreme Court's occasional proclamations to the contrary. See,
e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."). For discussions of the misleading nature
of O'Brien, see Kagan, supra note 2, at 414 ("[N]otwithstanding the Court's protestations in
O'Brien,... First Amendment law... has as its primary, though unstated, object the
discovery of improper government motives."); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 775-76 ("[T]he
O'Brien test itself is centrally concerned with legislative purpose, despite the Court's
protests to the contrary.").
142 See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
143 Fallon, supra note 8, at 98.
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Part looks beyond the quip to more elaborate normative arguments for and
against basing constitutional outcomes on government intentions. Two
disciplines, constitutional law theory and moral philosophy, give varying
answers to the question whether intentions should matter to the
permissibility of action.
A. INTENTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Recall that intentions have several functions. Authorial intention may
be relevant to the task of textual interpretation, and separately, an actor's
intention may determine the law's classification of his or her act. The vast
literature on authorial intent and the interpretation of constitutional or
statutory text may be set aside here, for our focus is on the question of
classification: why might state intentions be relevant to the classification of
state actions as constitutional or unconstitutional? Here, I explore several
arguments in defense of intent inquiries, and then examine the rationales for
the rejection of subjective inquiries in Fourth Amendment doctrine.
First, the relevance of state intentions can be defended with a
consequentialist argument that focuses on the correlation between
intentions and results; the claim is that by basing legal liability on certain
intentions, we can prevent or reduce the bad results associated with those
intentions. Under this view, intent may be legally significant if it serves as
a proxy or predictor of some other harm. A kick is worse than a stumble
because kicks cause more damage, or because those who intend to kick are
more likely to do damage than those who are merely clumsy or negligent. 1
45
Elena Kagan has proposed an argument along these lines as a possible
144 Even the quip is unclear: it is usually taken to signify that there is a recognized
distinction between accidents and intentional harm, one so obvious that even a dog could see
it. But note that the quip could also direct our attention to the subjective views of the victim
of harm-the dog-and suggest that because all victims see a distinction between intentional
harm and accidents, the law should reflect that distinction as well. With the possible
exception of Baze v. Rees, see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text, American courts
have not typically considered the subjective experience of the prisoner as a key determinant
of whether state action is "punishment," or whether it is "cruel and unusual." In a
forthcoming article, Adam Kolber argues that assessments of punishment severity must take
into account the prisoner's subjective experience. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective
Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1090337.
145 For example, Holmes noted that the common law crime of larceny required both the
taking of property and proof of an intention to deprive the owner of ownership. Accidental
displacement of property, or even unauthorized borrowing, is not larceny. Here intent serves
to identify a likely future harm-permanent deprivation of property-and allow the state to
punish for that. "[T]he intent is an index to the external event which probably would have
happened .... HOLMES, supra note 1, at 72.
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explanation for the focus on content-based and viewpoint-based
suppression of speech in First Amendment doctrine. 146 And Charles Fried
has suggested that motive inquiries may sometimes be the most efficient
way of preventing bad results or achieving good ones. 147
Another theory of government motive analysis focuses on certain
kinds of intentions as being themselves intrinsically harmful. On Kagan's
account, this theory underlies Holmes's distinction between stumbles and
kicks: "The former may suggest a lack of optimal care, but the latter
suggests contempt or hatred." 148  Similar reasoning drives expressive
theories of law, which classify certain kinds of government action as
constitutional or unconstitutional based on the attitudes said actions
express. 149  An attitude is not exactly equivalent to an intention, but
government intentions help determine the social meaning, or expressed
attitude, of state action.150 The concern with intentional discrimination in
equal protection doctrine can be understood as a reflection of the view that
certain motivations are intrinsically harmful. 151 Scholars sympathetic to the
expressivist view often emphasize that illicit intentions are neither
necessary nor sufficient to establish unconstitutionality; courts must
146 Kagan, supra note 2, at 506-10.
[I]n general, a system in which the government freely may restrict ideas on the ground that
they challenge the power or wisdom of officials will produce a less healthy debate than a system
in which the government has no such ability. A rule proscribing actions arising from censorial
motive thus will promote [open discourse].
Id. at 508.
147 If a particular effect is likely to be produced [in most cases] only by those who want to
produce that effect, and if it is an effect that people not seeking to produce it are likely to
avoid-as in the case of killing-then the prohibition directed at intentional killing reaches much
of what is needed and does so without sweeping in presumably neutral or useful conduct that
only produces this result accidentally.
Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 64 (1997).
148 Kagan, supra note 2, at 510.
149 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 59, at 1504-05; Deborah Hellman, The Expressive
Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1, 13-15 (2000).
15o See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 59, at 1509 ("An attitude toward a person is a
complex set of dispositions to perceive, have emotions, deliberate, and act in ways oriented
toward that person."); id. at 1513 ("[P]eople's conscious purposes and intentions, while
relevant, are not the sole determinants of what attitudes their actions express.").
151 Kagan writes that "equal protection law ... treats deliberate discrimination having
trivial consequences as more problematic than incidental discrimination having great
impact," Kagan, supra note 2, at 5 10-11, but the expressivist might refine this explanation to
say that the consequences of deliberate discrimination are never trivial: "For example, the
harm from racial segregation does not lie simply in its material consequences .... There
is... also an independent expressive harm, which we would call a 'stigmatic' harm."
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 59, at 1542.
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evaluate the full public meaning of government action, taking into account
not only intentions, but also effects and perceptions.152
A related but distinct account holds that illicit motives are a mark of
bad moral character. Charles Fried defends this view, suggesting that even
collective entities can have bad characters: "Our actions and our goals are
what define us and what determine our character, and if bad things are part
of what we are invested in, the corruption is more intense and complete.
And so it may be with institutions as well." '153 But stated as a concern about
institutional character, this argument seems ill-suited to explain
constitutional doctrine. It requires us to understand findings of
unconstitutionality as attributions of blame or condemnation applied to
government entities. On most accounts, though, the Constitution is not so
much a moral catechism for a personified government as a set of limitations
on government power. 154 The concern with moral corruption relies on an
anthropomorphic view of the state and may produce overly narrow
constitutional protections. 
1 55
A more promising approach recasts the argument that illicit motives
are a mark of bad character as a claim that illicit motives violate principles
of government neutrality. Here, the concern is not so much a moral
evaluation of the government, but an effort to preserve an open, unbiased
decisionmaking process.1 56  Paul Brest defended this account of motive
152 See Hellman, supra note 149, at 39 ("[E]vidence of subjective intent matters only so
long as that evidence contributes to the public meaning of the action."). Tribe argues that "if
a government-enacted rule of conduct is constitutionally inoffensive both on its face and as
applied to the particular individual challenging it"--that is, inoffensive in its effects-the
fact of illicit motive "tells us nothing more than that the government body engaged in an
unsuccessful attempt to violate the Constitution." Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive,
Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal
Sacrifice, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 23.
153 Fried, supra note 147, at 64.
154 Or, as put by Todd Rakoff: "We are not really that interested in whether our officials
have good or bad souls ...." Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory
of Contracts, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 76 (1994).
155 Several commentators have resisted any approach to equal protection doctrine that
looks for blameworthy, "guilty" state actors rather than demanding collective responsibility
for the effects of even unconscious discrimination. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1036 (1988);
Lawrence, supra note 4, at 323-26.
156 Fried, after initially introducing the language of character, seems to shift toward this
more procedural commitment to government neutrality:
The limits the Constitution places on government may be understood not just in terms of
minimizing certain sorts of harms, but in ruling certain goals out of bounds for goverment
altogether. The furtherance or suppression of religion, for instance, are simply not part of what
government may aim at all.
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analysis in one of the earliest treatments of the issue.157 A reviewing court
should ask "what criteria or objectives the [government] decisionmaker
took into account"; the aim is not to prohibit specific substantive outcomes,
but to ensure an unbiased political process. 151
Since constitutional theorists first turned substantial attention to
motive analysis over thirty years ago, almost all have concluded that
motives are relevant to constitutionality in at least some ways, in at least
some circumstances. Each of the accounts above recognizes the evidentiary
challenges of motive analysis, but suggests that courts are capable of
overcoming these challenges and making fair assessments of government
intentions. 59 To be clear, these accounts suggest that only rarely, if ever,
should government motives be wholly dispositive. Bad motives with no
corresponding bad effects are sometimes portrayed as merely "unsuccessful
attempt[s]" to violate the Constitution. 160  Separately, courts and
commentators often assert that benign motives cannot save an otherwise
unconstitutional law.161  Within these limitations, constitutional theorists
Fried, supra note 147, at 64.
157 Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95, 125; see also Kagan, supra note 2, at 512-13
(describing requirements of neutral decisionmaking based in liberal and democratic theory).
158 Brest, supra note 157, at 125. Brest applies this reasoning to argue that Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), was wrongly decided. Palmer involved an equal protection
claim that the city of Jackson, Mississippi had closed its public swimming pools only to
avoid having to open them to Blacks. The Supreme Court rejected this complaint: "[N]o
case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because
of the motivations of the men who voted for it." Id. at 224. But under Brest's neutral
process theory, actual racist motivations, assuming they were present, distorted the neutral
decisionmaking process and violated the Equal Protection Clause, even if a fair and unbiased
deliberation could conceivably have produced the same substantive outcome. Brest, supra
note 157, at 125.
159 See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 59, at 1524 (claiming that "[e]xpressive
theories have resources, beyond agents' self-interpretations, for interpreting their purposes,"
and describing those resources); Brest, supra note 157, at 119-24 (discussing ways of
ascertaining government intentions); Fried, supra note 147, at 61 (describing "a variety of
devices" that can be used to assign intent to public actors); Kagan, supra note 2, at 509-10
(describing First Amendment rules that help "flush out improper motive"); Larry G. Simon,
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041, 1065-1127 (1978) (outlining
extensive evidentiary principles to establish racial prejudice as a motivation).
160 Tribe, supra note 152, at 23.
161 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 159, at 1046-47 (arguing that motive analysis "does not
mean that a court should hold government action unconstitutional on the basis of the
motivation behind it without regard to whether harmful consequences result"); Tribe, supra
note 152, at 26 ("[A]n otherwise impermissible government action ordinarily cannot be
saved from constitutional invalidation by the innocent, benign, or even exemplary motives or
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have generally embraced the various ways in which First Amendment and
equal protection doctrines take government motives into consideration.
There is one more explanation for the judicial concern with state
intentions, an explanation more prosaic and less extensively theorized. The
focus on state intentions may simply be an attempt to cabin the reach of the
Constitution-that is, an attempt to avoid a world in which every
government action comes within the Constitution's purview and requires
extensive judicial scrutiny. This explanation seems most plausible when
state intentions are critical to a threshold inquiry that precedes ultimate
resolution of the constitutional question. For example, an intent to classify
by race is a threshold requirement of equal protection doctrine; upon a
showing of intentional racial classification, a court will then apply strict
scrutiny to the classification. But without evidence that disparate effects are
the result of intentional discrimination, courts apply a more deferential
standard.'62 Similarly, as we have seen, an intent to punish is a threshold
requirement of several constitutional provisions, including the Ex Post
Facto Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause, and in the absence of
punitive intent courts tend to defer to legislative choices. 163
To varying degrees, these arguments for the relevance of state
intentions might explain aspects of First, Fourteenth, and Eighth
Amendment doctrine. With respect to the Fourth Amendment, however,
the Supreme Court has taken a different approach. Though the dog's
distinction between kicks and stumbles is not entirely irrelevant to Fourth
Amendment doctrine,' 64 the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
intentions that led the government to take that action."); see also Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2764-65 (2007) (rejecting
argument that "benign" racial classifications be afforded more deference).
162 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but... [s]tanding alone, it does not trigger the rule... that racial classifications
are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations.").
163 See supra Part III.A.
164 In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), the Court held that a Fourth
Amendment "seizure" requires that the police act intentionally. The word "seizure," the
Court reasoned, "can hardly be applied to an unknowing act." Id. at 596. But the Court
parsed the kind of intention required in very specific terms:
Thus, if a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins a passerby against a wall,
it is likely that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the
situation would not change if the passerby happened, by lucky chance, to be a serial murderer for
whom there was an outstanding arrest warrant--even if, at the time he was thus pinned, he was in
the process of running away from two pursuing constables. It is clear, in other words, that a
Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused
termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever
there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual's
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constitutional reasonableness of police action does not depend on officers'
intentions.165 As other commentators have observed, this general rule is
repeated often, but rarely explained or defended. 16 6  Government briefs
defending strictly objective Fourth Amendment tests have made broad
references to "justice and practicality"'67 and have warned of the
"variability and instability"'168 of subjective inquiries. Wayne LaFave has
argued that subjective inquiries will end up requiring too much of police
officers.'69 It could be that courts believe themselves ill-suited to inquire
into the subjective mental states of police officers. It could be that we care
about how officers act, not what they think.17 (Notice, though, that all
these explanations for objective inquiries in Fourth Amendment doctrine
could apply to the use of force in the Eighth Amendment context as well.)
freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.
Id. at 596-97. The Court has also found state intentions relevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis of "special needs" searches. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
45-46 (2000) ("[Plrogrammatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth
Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized
suspicion.").
165 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000) ("[T]he subjective
intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's
actions violate the Fourth Amendment .... [T]he issue is not his state of mind, but the
objective effect of his actions." (citations omitted)); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
813 (1996) ("[W]e have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on
the actual motivations of individual officers .. "); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989) ("An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an
objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively
unreasonable use of force constitutional."). See generally Dix, supra note 10 (describing
rejection of subjective intent inquiries in most Fourth Amendment contexts).
166 See Dix, supra note 10, at 444 (noting the "lack of any focused attention" on whether
the rejection of subjective inquiries is consistent with Fourth Amendment principles).
167 Brief for the United States at 31, Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (No. 76-
6767).
168 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 05-502).
169 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 1.4(d) (4th ed. 2004).
170 In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that the doctrinal focus on
"objective factors" is not based primarily on evidentiary considerations. Whren, 517 U.S. at
814 (1996). But the Court offered no alternative rationale; it simply asserted that "the Fourth
Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain
circumstances, whatever the subjective intent." Id. This claim states the conclusion, but
makes no defense of it. The concept of reasonableness does not itself preclude consideration
of motivations. For example, in evaluating the reasonableness of a decision to hire or fire an
employee, one might consider whether the decision was based on racial bias toward the
employee.
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Whatever the reason for the emphasis on objective inquiries in Fourth
Amendment law, that doctrinal area is clearly exceptional: for the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, state intentions matter.
B. INTENTIONS AND MORAL PERMISSIBILITY
In stark contrast to the widespread emphasis on intentions in
constitutional analysis, a growing philosophical literature argues that
intentions are irrelevant to moral permissibility. For the most part, these
philosophical arguments draw on fictional problems that compare a
scenario in which harm is intentionally inflicted to a similar scenario in
which harm is foreseen and allowed to occur, but not actively intended. 17 '
The constitutional law of punishment occasionally relies on a similar
intention-foresight distinction: legislation may be classified as non-punitive
if the law's punishment-like effects are only foreseen but not intended,
17 2
and the use of force in prison passes constitutional muster when gratuitous
harm to the prisoner is foreseen but not intended. 173 The philosophical
challenges to this distinction may offer reasons for skepticism about these
intent standards in the law of punishment. Indeed, David Enoch has
recently argued that the reasons to question the distinction between
intention and foresight are especially forceful in the context of state
action. 1
74
Much of the philosophical literature on intentions and moral
permissibility stems from doubts about the doctrine of double effect.
Generally, this doctrine posits that when an action has both a desirable and
an undesirable effect-double effects-the action may be morally
permissible so long as the undesirable effect, though foreseeable, is not
actively intended either as an independent end or as a means to an end. 1
75
'71 This philosophical distinction between intention and foresight is not parallel to the
simplest version of the dog's distinction, which separates intended harms from not-
necessarily-foreseen stumbles. Here we are in the realm of more nuanced intent judgments.
172 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98-99 (2003) (arguing that stigma imposed by sex
offender registration requirement did not render the law punitive, since the stigma was
merely incidental and not "an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme"). See
generally Part ILA, supra.
173 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841-43 (1994). See generally Part III.C, supra.
174 See David Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing, and the State, 13 LEGAL THEORY 69 (2007).
175 The doctrine is traced to the works of St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and
frequently invoked in Catholic theology. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and
the Doctrine of Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 19 (Oxford ed. 2002). For discussions of the doctrine in relation to Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), and other constitutional decisions, see Edward C. Lyons, In
Incognito-The Principle of Double Effect in American Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REv.
469 (2005); Shiffrin, supra note 59.
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Put simply, under the doctrine of double effect, intentions are at least
sometimes relevant to moral permissibility. 176 To take one example, the
doctrine is used to distinguish between a terrorist bomber who targets a
children's hospital and intends the children's deaths, and a strategic bomber
who targets a munitions factory, foreseeing but not intending that his bomb
will also destroy a nearby children's hospital and kill the patients there.
The terrorist bomber acts immorally; the strategic bomber does not. 
177
Some critics have rejected the doctrine as facially absurd: "It is a very
odd idea ... that a person's intentions play a role in fixing what he may or
may not do."' 178  Judith Jarvis Thomson imagines a pilot considering
whether to bomb a village with both a munitions factory and a children's
hospital: "Can anyone really think that the pilot should decide whether he
may drop the bombs by looking inward for the intention with which he
would be dropping them if he dropped them?" 179 Others place the burden
of persuasion on the doctrine's proponents: "[N]o one has.., come up with
a satisfying theoretical explanation of why ... the difference between
consequences that are intended and those that are merely
foreseen ... should make a moral difference."' 180 The critics of the doctrine
of double effect argue that it rests on a mistaken conflation of the moral
permissibility of an action with the moral worth of the agent who performs
the action. Intentions are clearly relevant to the latter, but not necessarily
relevant to the former: "There is such a thing as doing the right (or a
permissible) thing for reasons that show one to be a bad person."'181
176 See Foot, supra note 175, at 22 (emphasizing that supporters of the doctrine of double
effect are committed to "the thesis that sometimes it makes a difference to the permissibility
of an action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the
agent's direct intention").
177 I have adapted this example from Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283, 292 (1991). Thomson does not herself subscribe to the doctrine of double
effect.
178 Id. at 293.
179 Id.; see also Judith Jarvis Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral
Arguments, 109 ETHICS 497, 515 (1999) (imagining a doctor deciding whether to inject a
patient with a lethal drug dose, and claiming that it is "absurd" to think that the moral
permissibility of the injection "turns on whether the doctor would be doing so intending
death or only intending relief from pain").
180 T.M. Scanlon & Jonathan Dancy, Intention and Permissibility (pt. 1), 74 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN Soc. 301, 303 (2000).
181 Id. at 305; see also Frances M. Kamm, Terrorism and Several Moral Distinctions, 12
LEGAL THEORY 19, 28 (2006) (arguing that an actor's intentions matter to the moral
assessment of the actor, but not necessarily to the judgment whether the act itself is
permissible); Thomson, supra note 179, at 517 ("[Tlhe question whether it is morally
permissible for a person to do a thing just is not the same as the question whether the person
who does it is thereby shown to be a bad person.").
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David Enoch has recently expanded upon these appeals to intuition
with the suggestion that reliance on the intention-foresight distinction is
often an attempt to avoid moral responsibility. A bomber deciding whether
to target a village should take responsibility for all foreseen consequences.
Insisting that he intends some deaths but only foresees others is, arguably,
"not so much.., an honest attempt to unearth the morally relevant features
of the circumstances but ... an attempt to prepare a line of defense." 182
And this objection to the purported distinction between intended and merely
foreseen harm, Enoch argues, is particularly relevant in the context of state
action. "Perhaps... individuals are entitled to... settle for having a good
will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely
what stateswomen and statesmen-and certainly states-are not entitled to
settle for." 183 State actors have special responsibility to take into account
all foreseen effects of their actions, and may not "hide behind the intending-
foreseeing distinction." 
184
Enoch also suggests that because the collective intentions of state
institutions are "highly complex" and "artificial things" constructed out of
"the intentions of [individual state actors],. . . facts about decisionmaking
mechanisms.... matters of institutional design, [and] internal power
struggles," they are "very poor candidates for intrinsic normative
significance."'' 85 He concludes that "we should be very suspicious" of the
intending/foreseeing distinction "in the case of state action." 186 And even if
182 Enoch, supra note 174, at 81; see also ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 49 n.5 (1995) (noting that motives are usually invoked "principally in
after-the-fact justifications of one's actions to others").
183 Enoch, supra note 174, at 91. Enoch elaborates, citing Daryl Levinson:
[P]erhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are
autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and
relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more
impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments.
Id. at 91 (citing Daryl J. Levinson, Personified Government and Constitutional Morality
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/daryl-draft 2-.pdf
(last visited Oct. 11, 2008).
184 Id. at 91. As Enoch notes, his argument is somewhat similar to one recently advanced
by Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule in the context of capital punishment. See Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions,
and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703, 722 (2005) ("The very concept of
'intentional' action, and the moral relevance of intention, are both obscure when government
is the pertinent moral agent."). Sunstein and Vermeule go on to argue that the act-omission
distinction is inapplicable to governments, which influence outcomes both by acting and
declining to act, and therefore empirical evidence that capital punishment deters murders
may generate a positive obligation to impose death sentences. See id. at 724-28.
185 Enoch, supra note 174, at 86.
186 Id. at 93.
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we retain doctrinal inquiries into state intentions, we should "be clear about
the rationales" for doing so.187
Here, then, we have several arguments that intentions do not
necessarily determine moral permissibility, especially in the context of state
action. There is, of course, considerable distance between these
philosophical discussions, focused as they are on the narrow distinction
between intention and foresight, and the explanations offered by
constitutional theorists for motive analysis in constitutional law. Together,
however, the two literatures provide a substantial array of arguments that
might justify, or condemn, the focus on state intentions in the constitutional
law of punishment.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF PUNISHMENT REVISITED
A. THE THRESHOLD INQUIRY
The first way in which state intentions are relevant to the constitutional
law of punishment is the threshold inquiry into punitive intent. It seems
clear that in order to apply constitutional provisions that restrict
punishment, courts need a definition of punishment and some way to
distinguish punishment from other unpleasant consequences of state action.
Should intent be the basis of this distinction?
At least three different approaches to defining punishment have been
proposed in Supreme Court opinions. The majority approach, as we have
seen, places considerable weight on evidence of the state's "punitive
intent," but objective factors are also nominally relevant. 188 A narrower
definition, advanced by Justice Thomas, holds that only sentences formally
authorized by statute or pronounced by a judge constitute "punishment."'1 89
Finally, some Justices have argued for a definition that focuses on the actual
experience of the prisoner and encompasses prison conditions without
187 Id. at 97.
188 See supra Part III.A.; see also Kamal Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for
Crime: The Punishment Clause and Sexual Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REv. 607, 634-35 (2008)
(describing "the intent approach" to defining punishment); Thomas K. Landry,
"Punishment" and the Eighth Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1607, 1616-20 (1996)
(describing "the subjectivist definition").
189 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[J]udges
or juries-but not jailers-impose 'punishment."'). For further discussion of Justice
Thomas's arguments, see Ghali, supra note 188, at 637-38 (labeling Justice Thomas's view
"the formalist approach"); Landry, supra note 188, at 1613-14 (labeling Justice Thomas's
view "the strictural definition"); Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 139, 163-65 (2006).
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reference to prison officials' intentions. 190  Of these accounts, Justice
Thomas's is the narrowest, requiring not only intent to punish but a
manifestation of that intent in te particular form of a criminal statute or
sentencing decision, and the focus on the prisoner's actual experience is the
broadest. In principle, the majority approach seems to steer a middle
course. In practice, though, the considerable deference afforded to the
descriptions of state intentions by government lawyers at the time of
litigation means the majority approach has produced a relatively narrow
understanding of punishment that is much closer to Justice Thomas's
approach. 191
There are several reasons to reject the claim that punitive intent,
narrowly understood, is essential to the very concept of punishment. First,
recall that intention is not simply binary-intentional or accidental-but
plural, so that the category of intentional acts may be further subdivided
according to the actor's specific purposes. 192 In one oft-cited passage on
the intentional nature of punishment, the Court invokes both binary and
plural concepts of intention, only to collapse them:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This
is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century .... [Ihf
[a] guard accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be
punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether we
consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.193
Even assuming this passage to be correct with respect to history and
ordinary meaning, it is important to note that the proffered example does
not support the initial claim that punishment must be "intended to chastise
or deter." To exclude the broken toe from the category of punishment is
only to invoke the dog's binary distinction between kicks and stumbles; it is
to say that purely accidental stumbles cannot constitute punishment. That
claim tells us nothing about which intentions, once we are in the realm of
kicks, might underlie acts properly classified as punishment.
190 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854-55 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("'Punishment' does not necessarily imply a culpable state of mind on the part of an
identifiable punisher. A prisoner may experience punishment when he suffers 'severe,
rough, or disastrous treatment."' (internal citations omitted)); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
306 (1991) (White, J., concurring) ("[Prison] conditions are themselves part of the
punishment, even though not specifically 'meted out' by a statute or judge."); see also Ghali,
supra note 188, at 635-36 (labeling this view "the realist approach"); Landry, supra note
188, at 1614-16 (labeling it "the experiential definition").
191 See supra note 83.
192 See supra Part II.B.
193 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985)).
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It is simply not true that only acts intended to chastise or deter are
commonly recognized as punishment, or were recognized as punishment at
the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted. Public officials, legislators,
sentencing commissioners, sociologists, political scientists, and other
punishment theorists have cited a wide range of reasons to punish. There is
little doubt that what we call punishment is sometimes aimed at
incapacitation, sometimes at reform or rehabilitation, and in still other
instances at restoration of wealth or other goods to the victim, at
demonstrating the punisher's political power, or at the satisfaction of
popular sentiment. 194 In ordinary language, the term punishment is used
still more broadly, referring to any deliberate infliction of severe pain or
harsh physical treatment irrespective of the motive behind the infliction.
Importantly for those who purport to care about the original understanding
of the Eighth Amendment, the Amendment's early defenders explicitly
stated that it would prevent torture intended to produce confessions.1 95
Such torture was neither authorized as a sentence pursuant to a conviction
nor intended to chastise or deter, but it was unquestionably an instance of
"cruel and unusual punishment" in the view of Patrick Henry, George
Mason, and other early Americans. Today, discussions of torture rarely
address the Eighth Amendment, because the Court's modem understanding
of the definition of punishment excludes interrogation methods or other
194 For arguments that a central purpose of modem punishment is the consolidation and
reinforcement of political power, see JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How
THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR (2007); Stuart A. Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology. Power,
Authority, and the Post-Liberal State, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 857, 861-63 (1998). See also
Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment, 28
OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 67-68 (2008) (identifying six objectives of punishment
mentioned in Canadian criminal law).
195 At the meeting of Virginia delegates to discuss the proposed federal constitution,
Patrick Henry raised the possibility that without a ban on cruel and unusual punishments,
Congress might introduce "the practice.., of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime."
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787,
TOGETHER WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, LUTHER MARTIN'S LETTER,
YATE'S MINUTES, CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS, VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF '98-
'99, AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 448 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.,
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1881). When another delegate suggested that a bill of
rights would provide "no security against torture," George Mason responded that "[a]nother
clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted;
therefore, torture was included in the prohibition." Id. at 452.
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exercises of force prior to a criminal conviction. 96 Ironically, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment applied only post-
conviction by rejecting a purpose-based understanding of punishment in
favor of one that focused on the actual circumstances of the punished. 197
Still, it is worth remembering that interrogational torture was very much on
the minds of those who insisted on the necessity of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 1'9
8
So history and common linguistic usage belie the Court's (and
originally, Judge Richard Posner's) claim that punishment encompasses
only "act[s] intended to chastise or deter."'' 99 Nor is it the case that in order
to punish, an actor must necessarily think of himself as punishing. Even if
punishment is always a deliberate act-that is, non-accidental-it need not
be defined in terms of intent to punish. Michael Moore's recent discussion
of "classificatory questions" of intention is helpful here.200  A criminal
statute may prohibit "intentional maiming." A defendant swings a stick
intending to put out his victim's left eye, but the concept of maiming does
not cross the defendant's mind. Even though the defendant does not
formulate his own purpose in terms of maiming per se, a fact-finder might
reasonably conclude that intent to put out an eye is properly classified as
intent to maim.201 Similarly, deliberate state action may sometimes be
properly classified as punishment, even if the state actors themselves
decline to formulate their purpose in terms of punishment. Indeed, this
understanding of punishment motivated the Court's list of factors in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.z20 Under that test, a number of objective
factors-the type of sanction, its severity, and its imposition for criminal
behavior-could demonstrate the punitive nature of a law, regardless of
whether the legislature chose to label its action as "punishment." Purely
196 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) ("Eighth Amendment
scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.").
197 See id. at 669-70 (emphasizing objective differences between schoolchildren and'
prisoners); id. at 670 n.39 (rejecting "purposive analysis" proposed by the dissent).
198 For a lengthier discussion of references to interrogational torture in early discussions
of the Eighth Amendment, see Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to
the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 661 (2004). See also Michael J.
Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty Is "Cruel and Unusual, " 74 U. CIN.
L. REv. 819, 834-35, 838-39 (2006).
199 Judge Posner authored the Duckworth v. Franzen passage quoted by the Court in
Wilson v. Seiter.
200 See Moore, supra note 17, at 50-53.
201 Id, at 51-52.
202 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); see supra Part III.A.
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accidental conduct (a prison official's stumble over a prisoner's foot) would
not satisfy the Mendoza-Martinez test, but a deliberate state action (the
indefinite confinement of sex offenders) might qualify as punishment even
if the state claimed to act without punitive intent.
Even if punitive intent is not essential to the definition of punishment,
the question arises whether other considerations might make motive
analysis appropriate here. Most of the arguments advanced by
constitutional theorists for scrutinizing state intentions in the context of
First Amendment and equal protection challenges seem inapplicable. In
those contexts, courts have identified categorically objectionable motives
for state action, such as racial bias or intent to suppress ideas or promote
religion. Because the motives are always objectionable, it makes sense to
look for them. But the intent to punish is not categorically prohibited.
Unlike the intent to discriminate by race, the intent to punish does not
distort the political process, nor does it seem to constitute a dignitary
violation in itself.
There is a sense, however, in which expressive theories of law might
find the intent to punish relevant. As detailed above, some scholars
understand scrutiny of government motives relevant to an assessment of the
"expressed attitude" of government action. 0 3 If we were to understand
punishment in expressivist terms, as many commentators have argued we
should, then the intent to punish may appear important.20 4 In expressive
theories, punishment is best understood as a stigma imposed by society to
communicate condemnation and disapproval.20 5 Just as evidence of the
government's intent to discriminate by race would be one determinant of
the attitude expressed by policies of segregation, evidence of a legislative
intent to punish would be one determinant of the attitude expressed by
various burdens imposed on convicted criminals.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the expressive theory is
206persuasive, it is important to note that it does not require us to make
punitive intent a necessary condition of punishment. Some expressive
theorists deny that professed intentions are wholly determinative of the
public meaning of an act, and so would explicitly reject a doctrinal
203 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 59.
204 The classic expressivist account of punishment is Joel Feinberg, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95 (1970).
205 Seeid. at 100-01.
206 For an extensive critique of expressive theories, including a detailed analysis of
expressive theories of punishment, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000).
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definition of punishment that made punitive intent dispositive.2 °7
Furthermore, to the extent that expressive theories direct our attention to the
stigma imposed by criminal punishment, we should note that the state can
stigmatize without necessarily intending to do so. In fact, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the stigma of sex offender registration requirements in
Smith v. Doe, but seemed to invoke a distinction between intention and
foresight.2z 8  Though registration requirements could "cause adverse
consequences for the convicted defendant, running from mild personal
embarrassment to social ostracism," this "stigma" was not "an integral part
of the objective of the regulatory scheme. 20 9 Stigma was a foreseeable
consequence, but it was not intended. If Enoch is persuasive that the
intention/foresight distinction has little relevance to our evaluations of state
action, then the expressive concern with stigma does not supply an
argument in favor of intent standards in the constitutional law of
punishment.
As the preceding discussion shows, arguments by constitutional
theorists and philosophers about the significance of government motive do
not provide a convincing defense of the substantial weight placed on
''punitive intent," and they provide several reasons to question that doctrinal
approach. At a broader level, we might ask whether the concern with
punitive intent is based on a misconception of the category punishment.
Under existing doctrine, courts treat punishment as a discrete act carried out
by a single actor: they identify particular statutes, policies, or events within
prison and ask whether these specific state actions were undertaken with
punitive intent. On this approach, punishment is a deliberate act that is, at
least conceptually, similar to intentional actions by individual humans.
This account grossly misrepresents government-imposed punishment.
Punishment is, in fact, a complex set of practices that involve a wide array
of actors and institutions. 210  Rarely can a single coherent intent be
attributed to the entire institutional apparatus that imposes punishment. The
intentions of individual officials within the criminal justice system may be
relevant to, but are not dispositive of, the question whether the system is
imposing punishment.
Consider all the state actions that must occur in order for a person to
be punished with a prison sentence: a legislature must codify an offense and
prescribe sanctions; law enforcement must detect a violation and
prosecutors must press charges; a court must oversee a trial or, more likely,
207 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 59; Hellman, supra note 149, at 39-40.
208 538 U.S. 84, 97-99 (2003).
209 Id. at 99.
210 See Ristroph, supra note 189, at 167-70.
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a plea agreement; police or other law enforcement personnel must
physically transfer the convicted person to the prison; and prison officials
must take and keep custody of the convict. 211  Even if the individual
legislators who codify the offense are thinking of nothing other than
winning reelection-or even if they are not thinking at all-and even if the
prosecutor is similarly concerned with reelection, and even if all other
participants view themselves as mere functionaries trying to avoid being
fired in order to keep their government paychecks, we do and should say
that this individual was punished. By common understanding (and for
originalists, by the common understanding at the time of the Founding),
punishment encompasses most of the unpleasant burdens that the state
imposes in response to ostensible misconduct.212
None of this is to suggest that punitive intent is wholly irrelevant to the
question whether state action is subject to the restrictions of the Bill of
Attainder Clause, or the Ex Post Facto Clause, or the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The argument, rather, is that punitive intent should not be the
determinative factor. To place as much weight on punitive intent as the
Court has done in Kansas v. Hendricks and other cases is to fail to
acknowledge the complex nature of state punishment. And the present
emphasis on punitive intent is, given the inevitable mushiness and "slop" of
intent assessments, an opening for courts to manipulate outcomes. We
might avoid some of the slop simply by reinvigorating the Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez standard, which makes punitive intent only one among
many factors that inform a decision to classify state action as
punishment.213
B. CRUELTY AND NUANCED INTENTIONS
Beyond the threshold inquiry into whether a state action is properly
called punishment, additional questions about state intention arise when
state action that is unquestionably punishment is claimed to be "cruel and
unusual." Just as we need a doctrinal account of punishment, we need a
doctrinal account of cruelty-and unusualness, perhaps, though the Court
211 Even this account is greatly oversimplified; I have not mentioned the vast
administrative apparatus that enables the participants from each branch of government to
carry out their functions in this process.
212 According to Justice Thomas, one understanding of punishment in the early United
States was "[a]ny pain or suffering inflicted on a person for a crime or offense." Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER,
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
213 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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has tended to collapse unusualness into its concept of cruelty.2 14 As a
matter of broad principle, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' 21 5 This reference to
"standards of decency" appears to appeal to an objective, external measure
of cruelty, one not necessarily determined by a state actor's intentions.21 6
But as we have seen, the actual implementation of the Eighth Amendment
has produced rules that call for nuanced judgments about state intentions.
At least three different accounts of cruelty are at work, and each turns
on a determination of state intentions. When a punishment is challenged as
disproportionately severe, "cruel and unusual" is taken to mean
"excessive," and "excessive" means "more than the state's penological
purposes require." When ongoing conditions within a prison are
challenged, "cruel and unusual" means "deliberately indifferent to
deprivations of basic needs." Finally, when a specific act of force in prison
is challenged, "cruel and unusual" means "malicious and sadistic." The
question here is whether the work by constitutional theorists on government
motive analysis, or the philosophical literature on intentions and
permissibility, can shed light on these doctrinal references to state
intentions.
In Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, state intentions play a
peculiar role that seems to render the constitutional theory and moral
philosophy arguments inapplicable. In this context, courts do not make
normative evaluations of the state's penological purposes; rather,
penological purpose simply sets the baseline against which the court
evaluates whether the punishment is excessive.217 Recall that in Ewing v.
214 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) ("Whether the word 'unusual'
has any qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' is not clear."). Two recent articles
critique the Court's approach and argue that the term "unusual" has independent
significance. See Joshua L. Shapiro, And Unusual: Examining the Forgotten Prong of the
Eighth Amendment, 38 U. MEM. L. REv. 465 (2008); John F. Stinneford, The Original
Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1739 (2008).
215 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
216 Paulo Barrozo identifies four conceptions of cruelty: one focused on the suffering of
the victim; one focused on the state of mind of the allegedly cruel agent; one focused on the
behavior of the agent; and one focused on the context of the act, including any structural
injustices. Paulo D. Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly: Punishment, Cruelty, and Mercy, 2 CRIM.
L. & PHIL. 67, 69-70 (2008). The fourth of these conceptions is "objective," Barrozo argues,
and he suggests that it underlies challenges to the death penalty that focus on background
inequality and race discrimination. See id. at 70 n.9.
217 For capital sentences, the analysis is somewhat different. The Supreme Court has
assumed two possible purposes of capital punishment-retribution and deterrence-and in
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California, a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for shoplifting may have
been excessive against a just deserts standard, but given the state's
underlying goal of incapacitation, the long sentence was appropriate. 21 8
Again, the Court has not suggested that the punishing state's penological
goals are relevant to constitutional analysis because they have intrinsic
moral significance. In fact, the Supreme Court's deferential approach
seems specifically to reject the claim that penological theories have intrinsic
moral relevance that would require the Eighth Amendment to be understood
in terms of one or another specific punishment theory.219
This deference to penological purposes renders the proportionality
requirement of the Eighth Amendment fairly weak, and maybe even
completely ineffectual. The scope of the Eighth Amendment depends on
what purposes the legislature has chosen to pursue (or what purposes may
be attributed to the legislature). 220  As long as the legislature can tell a
plausible story about its purposes and the connection between purposes and
221policies, the Eighth Amendment is satisfied. Under this approach, the
Eighth Amendment does not itself impose limitations on what purposes the
legislature may legitimately choose, and it does not seem to impose any real
limitation on what the state may do in pursuit of its chosen penological
individual cases, it does not inquire which, if either, of these purposes actually motivated the
punishing state. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (identifying
retribution and deterrence as social purposes of the death penalty). Instead, in recent
decisions, the Court has taken a majoritarian approach, declaring the death penalty
unconstitutionally severe for certain categories of crime if and only if there is a "national
consensus" opposing the penalty in that context. See id. at 313-16; see also Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (identifying possible purposes of the death sentence,
but then describing the national consensus approach).
218 See supra Part III.B.
219 See supra Part III.B.
220 As we saw with respect to the claim that California had rejected just deserts in favor
of incapacitation in Ewing, the purposes attributed to a criminal statute at the time of
litigation need not coincide with those articulated by the legislature that passed it. See supra
Part III.B.
221 This point was raised during oral arguments in Ewing, though it obviously did not
determine the outcome of the decision.
QUESTION: ... If we allow, for purposes of proportionality or gross disproportionality
analysis,.. . the consideration of varying intentions-retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and
so on-and every time the State gets to a very high offense, the State says, 'Oh, we've changed
the theory. We've gone from deterrence to retribution,' it seems to me that it
makes ... proportionality analysis-impossible .... [I]f we accept the State's option to say,
'We've changed the theory,' don't we read comparability analysis right out of the law?
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 46, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)
(No. 01-6978).
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purposes.222 If we are committed to a proportionality restriction on the
government's power to punish, we need to look for an alternative to an
intent-based standard.223
In the Eighth Amendment cases that involve prisoners' complaints
about specific acts of violence or conditions of confinement, "cruel. and
unusual" means "deliberately indifferent" or "malicious and sadistic."
Here, the concern with official intentions is more easily comparable to
motive analysis elsewhere in constitutional law (and perhaps in other areas
of law as well). One could make consequentialist, expressivist, and
character-based arguments in support of the claims that prison officials'
intentions are relevant to constitutional analysis.22 ' For example, the
deliberate indifference standard could plausibly provide an effective
incentive for prison administrators to maintain adequate conditions.
Additionally, prison employees who use force with malice or sadism may
be likely to cause greater harm than those who do not. With respect to
expressive harms, one could argue that to be deprived of adequate nutrition,
medical care, or other necessities by an official acting deliberately, or to be
violently treated by an official acting with malice, is to suffer a greater harm
than to experience the same objective injuries without the accompanying
nasty intentions. On this account, deliberate indifference and malice are
themselves intrinsically harmful. Along similar lines, to the extent that we
view an individual public official's liability under § 1983 as a reflection of
his or her character, deliberate indifference or malice seem relevant aspects
of a character judgment.
So the rationales for motive analysis from constitutional theory have
some purchase in the context of Eighth Amendment challenges by
prisoners. At the same time, David Enoch's arguments against giving
substantial moral weight to state intentions seem particularly forceful here.
Enoch suggests that claims to have acted with good intentions-or claims
not to have had evil intentions-are most easily understood as evasions of
responsibility. Enoch argues that evasions of responsibility are troubling
when they come from state actors, who are charged with much greater
responsibilities than private individuals. And nowhere is the state's
responsibility for the safety and well-being of individual human beings
222 In a separate concurrence in Ewing, Justice Scalia argued that because the Eighth
Amendment did not mandate any particular theory of punishment, it could contain no
proportionality principle at all. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223 For an alternative approach to proportionality that does not depend on assessments of
penological purpose, see Ristroph, supra note 69, at 284-91, 326.
224 See supra Part IV.A.
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greater than when the state forcibly confines them.225 Indeed, federal
decisions involving prisoners' claims of cruel and unusual punishment do
seem to establish that official intentions are a device to evade responsibility.
Whatever transpires in the nation's prisons, the officials involved can nearly
always claim that they did not intend for the harm to occur.226 The burden
to prove otherwise is on the prisoner plaintiff, and it is a nearly impossible
burden to meet.
And of course, the problem is not simply that prisoners, and courts,
lack good evidence of prison officials' intentions. The further problem-
one familiar to us by now-is that judgments about intentions are inevitably
contestable. When a judge or other third party tries to ascertain a state
actor's intentions, she inevitably brings to bear her own background
knowledge and normative predilections. When the constitutional law of
punishment focuses on government motives, outcomes depend on
subjective judicial preferences.
VI. CONCLUSION
Americans troubled by the present scope of the penal power have
looked to the Federal Constitution to limit it. This Article has shown that
there is, in fact, a constitutional law of punishment, although its restrictions
are not very powerful. And the weakness of these restrictions seems related
to the significant role that state intentions play in determining the
constitutionality of state action. Analysis of the doctrinal significance of
state intentions gives us a more informed perspective on both the law of
punishment as it has been and the law as it might be.
First, the law as it has been. The language of judicial deference and
legislative prerogative in cases such as Ewing v. California and Kansas v.
Hendricks creates the impression that these decisions reflect judicial
restraint-the Court's modest refusal to impose its own subjective
preferences on democratically elected legislatures. Close attention to the
Court's determinations of legislative motives undermines the image of
restraint and modesty. There is no objective, disinterested way to ascertain
intention; a finding of intention is always a normative judgment. Whenever
the disposition of a case turns on a judicial construction of a state actor's
intentions, look closely: the intentions probably could have been
225 Similar reasoning led to the Supreme Court's finding that the state was obligated to
provide medical care and other basic necessities to prisoners. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); see also id. at 116 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
state has an affirmative duty to provide care to those it chooses to imprison, and denying that
intent is a necessary component of an Eighth Amendment claim).
226 See, e.g., supra notes 135-36.
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constructed otherwise. The Court could have drawn on the retributive
language in the preamble to California's three strikes law to strike down
Gary Ewing's sentence. The language of incapacitation and public safety
used to defend the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act could have been
used to classify that act as punishment. Again, constructions of intention
almost always could have come out otherwise.
And the law as it might be? Though motive analysis is prevalent
throughout several areas of constitutional law, I have suggested that it
should not necessarily occupy the same central role in the law of
punishment. Punishment seems to render individuals vulnerable to the state
in much more profound ways than most other state actions, and thus, it
seems to produce special obligations that state actors cannot avoid simply
by meaning well, or by claiming to have meant well.227 In the specific
context of punishment, it may be especially true that the road to hell is
paved with good intentions.
Justice William Brennan emphasized the distinctive nature of
punishment in his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp, 228 arguing that state
intentions that may be relevant in the equal protection context were
nonetheless irrelevant to Eighth Amendment analysis.2 29  Warren
McCleskey was a black man sentenced to death in Georgia for the murder
of a white police officer.230  He challenged his sentence on both equal
protection and Eighth Amendment grounds, introducing statistical evidence
that death sentences in Georgia and elsewhere were given
disproportionately to black defendants who killed white victims. 231' A
majority of the Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's claims, emphasizing
that the statistics did not prove discriminatory intent and announcing, "[W]e
decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. 232
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that discriminatory intent should not
be required to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. "While the Equal
Protection Clause forbids racial discrimination, and intent may be critical in
a successful claim under that provision, the Eighth Amendment has its own
227 Cf Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("An officer's evil intentions will
not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor
will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force
constitutional.").
228 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
229 Id. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 283.
231 Id. at 286-91.
232 Id. at 313. With respect to the equal protection claim, the majority also emphasized
that there was no evidence that the Georgia legislature adopted or maintained its capital
sentencing procedures with racially discriminatory intent. Id. at 298-99.
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distinct focus: whether punishment comports with social standards of
rationality and decency., 233 In effect, Justice Brennan was arguing for an
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that focused on empirically
observable factors rather than the subjective mental states of legislators,
jurors, or other state actors. "Once we can identify a pattern of arbitrary
sentencing outcomes, we can say that a defendant runs a risk of being
sentenced arbitrarily. It is... immaterial whether the operation of an
impermissible influence such as race is intentional. 234  And although
Justice Brennan was writing in dissent in McCleskey, the general notion that
the Eighth Amendment should focus on more objectively ascertainable
factors is often echoed elsewhere in Supreme Court opinions. 35
Thus, one way to make the Constitution a more effective limitation on
the power to punish would be to reduce the doctrinal focus on state
intentions. This Article suggests a few specific ways in which courts could
do that. They could, for example, take seriously the full range of factors
identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez in order to decide when state
action constitutes punishment. Courts could also move away from
consideration of penological purpose in proportionality analysis, thus
limiting legislatures' abilities to define the standards by which their actions
will be judged. Finally, courts could place greater emphasis on observable
harms and other objective factors in prison cases.
But even as we consider ways in which to make constitutional law a
more effective limitation of the power to punish, it is worth remembering
the limits of constitutional law itself. Even with doctrinal reform, enforcing
the Eighth Amendment and other constitutional provisions will remain a
deeply normative enterprise. Government motives will sometimes be
important, and even when they are not, other questions of interpretation will
require courts to exercise discretion. With respect to punishment and
elsewhere, constitutional law will continue to reflect the particular,
contestable judgments of the people who devise and apply it. At the very
least, we may hope that the judges who ascertain state intentions
acknowledge and attend to the normative nature of their enterprise. In this
context, self-awareness is as necessary a virtue as self-restraint.
233 Id. at 323 n. I (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234 Id.
235 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589-90 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(reiterating that the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning from evolving standards of
decency, and that "in discerning those standards, we look to objective factors to the
maximum possible extent" (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977))); Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (adopting Justice Kennedy's claim that proportionality
review must be "guided by objective factors").
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